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ABSTRACT 
ORGAN DONATION, TRUST AND RECIPROCITY 
BY 
DANYANG LI 
MAY, 2013 
Committee Chair:      Dr. James C. Cox 
Major Department:    Economics   
This dissertation consists of three chapters that focus on topics in fields of 
experimental economics and health economics. 
The first chapter, “Do I Care if You Know I Betrayed You?” , examines how 
concern for others’ disutility from betrayal can affect the decision to repay trust in the 
trust game.  We use a laboratory experiment to compare trustees’ behavior when betrayal 
is obfuscated to an identical monetary payoffs situation where betrayal is revealed.  We 
find that more trustees choose to defect in our experiment when betrayal is obfuscated 
than when it is revealed.  Our result suggests that concern for betrayal costs influences 
not only the decision to trust but also the decision to repay trust. 
The second chapter, “Increasing Organ Donation via Changes in the Default 
Choice or Allocation Rule”, utilizes a laboratory experiment to evaluate the effectiveness 
of alternative public policies targeted at increasing the rate of deceased donor organ 
donation. The experiment includes treatments across different default choices and organ 
allocation rules inspired by the donor registration systems applied in different countries.  
Our results indicate that the opt-out with priority rule system generates the largest 
 x 
 
increase in organ donation relative to an opt-in only program.  However, sizeable gains 
are achievable using either a priority rule or opt-out program separately, with the opt-out 
rule generating approximately 80% of the benefits achieved under a priority rule 
program. 
The third chapter, “Improving the Approach to Organ Donor Registration”, 
proposes to improve organ donor registry by providing a persuasive message with the 
registration request.  I designed a laboratory experiment to examine the impact of the 
persuasive message on donation decisions.  The results indicate that the persuasive 
message has a positive impact on donation decisions in the early rounds of the 
experiment.  Subjects were about 21 percent more likely to register as a donor in round 1 
of the experiment when they were provided with a persuasive message.  This behavioral 
difference across treatment decreased as subjects played more rounds, since subjects in 
the control treatment learned the information in the persuasive message through playing 
the game.  We further find this treatment effect is mainly from subjects who are not organ 
donors in real life, while the treatment effect is very small for those who are self-reported 
organ donors.  
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Chapter I: Do I Care if You Know I Betrayed You? 
Introduction 
People often are generous both in everyday life and in experiments.  This 
behavior has been often interpreted a preference for generous outcomes.  However, recent 
literature indicates that people may not really value the social outcome, they may instead, 
just want to be seen as being generous.  In a study by Güth et al. (1996), the authors 
modify the standard ultimatum game by varying the size of the cake, which can take 
either a large or a small value.  Only the proposer knows the true size of the cake.  They 
find that many proposers with a large cake offer the equal split of a small cake.  The 
authors refer to this behavior as “hiding behind some small cake.” 
We extend the literature by looking at the decision to cooperate in a trust game.  
We modified the trust game so that subjects can “hide behind a coin flip.”  In our 
modified trust game, the first mover’s (or “trustor’s”) decision to trust the second mover 
(or “trustee”) is “productive” (Deck 2009), which refers to the increase in total money 
payoff compared with the alternative choice.
1
  We introduced a move of nature in 
between the trustor’s decision and the trustee’s decision, which randomly determines the 
productivity level of trust.  This move of nature is determined by a coin flip.  The trustor 
does not observe nature’s move or the trustee’s decision unless they are revealed by his 
own payoff.  The key feature of the modified trust game is that when the trustee repays 
                                                 
1
 Henceforth, we use the common, although questionable, designation of the first mover as “trustor” and the 
second mover as “trustee” even though the first mover’s motivation may be trust or altruism, or both (Cox 
2004). 
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low-productivity trust, the trustor receives the same payoff as when the trustee betrays 
high-productivity trust.  That is, the trustor cannot infer betrayal of high-productivity 
trust. 
We recruited subjects to participate in two experimental treatments.  Subjects play 
the modified trust game in treatment 1.  In treatment 2, different subjects play a game 
identical to the modified trust game except that the trustor observes nature’s move at the 
end of the game, hence the trustor eventually has perfect information about the trustee’s 
decision.  We find that subjects repay high-productivity trust more frequently in 
treatment 2 than in treatment 1.  Results of the experiment show that people are more 
selfish when they can “hide behide a coin flip.”  Our findings are consistent with the prior 
findings that people may not really value the social outcome of cooperation, they may 
instead, just want to pretend to be cooperative.  
The next section of the paper describes some related literature.  Section 3 
describes the experimental design and protocol.  Section 4 reports the results from the 
experiment.  The final section of the paper concludes. 
Some Related Literature 
Traditional economic models assume that individuals’ actions are exclusively 
motivated by material self-interest.  The narrow material self-interest assumption is quite 
good at predicting behavior in many contexts.  However, in some contexts, this 
assumption does not work well.  Examples include ultimatum games (Güth et al. 1982; 
Slonim and Roth 1998), dictator games (Forsythe et al. 1994; Andreoni and Miller 2002), 
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and investment games (Berg et al. 1995; Cox 2004; Cox and Deck 2005).  Experimental 
studies of such games show that individuals often behave in a way that is inconsistent 
with narrow material self-interest. 
As a result of these findings, researchers have been motivated to develop models 
of other-regarding preferences.  These models assume individuals have genuine concern 
for others’ material payoffs.  This literature broadly falls into two classes: outcome-based 
models and models of reciprocity.  The outcome-based (distributional) models assume 
that individuals care about their own and others’ material payoffs.  Examples include 
inequality aversion models (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), quasi-
maximin models (Charness and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004), convex 
other-regarding preferences models (Andreoni and Miller 2002), and the egocentric 
altruism model (Cox and Sadiraj 2007; 2012).  Alternatively, models of reciprocity 
assume that individuals prefer to repay kind actions by others with similar actions 
themselves and, also, to repay unkind actions with similarly unkind ones.  For example, 
revealed altruism theory (Cox et al. 2008) assumes that one person’s generous action may 
change another person’s preferences and trigger a reciprocal response.  
A series of recent studies find that people often “pretend to be generous”, but do 
not truly value the generous outcome.  In a two-level ultimatum game experiment, Güth 
et al. (1996) find that subjects are more selfish when they can hide their selfish behavior 
“behind some small cake.”  In a dictator experiment by Dana et al. (2007), dictators are 
more likely to be selfish when they can stay ignorant of the recipients’ payoffs.  The 
related work by Dana et al. (2006) also shows that many subjects are willing to pay to 
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avoid the dictator decision.  Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) further find that 
communication could affect behavior by influencing beliefs about others’ beliefs.  In the 
study by Hamman et al. (2010), the authors find that subjects are more selfish when they 
can delegate their selfish actions to agents (a third party).  
Our work focuses on people’s decision to cooperate in a trust game.  We modified 
the trust game by introducing a random coin flip, which determines the productivity of 
trust.  In one treatment, only trustees can observe the realized outcome of the coin flip, so 
that they can hide their selfish actions “behind the coin flip.”  In another treatment, the 
realized outcome of the coin flip is common knowledge between trustors and trustees.  
We find that fewer subjects cooperate when betrayal is obfuscated from their partners.  
This finding cannot be explained by any of the above-cited outcome-based 
models.  Trustees with preferences consistent with those models should behave 
consistently across our treatments because the feasible sets of material payoff alternatives 
are identical across treatments.  Also, revealed altruism theory cannot be applied here 
without modification because opportunity sets in our modified trust game are not 
exclusively chosen by other (human) players.  
In a context of the trust game, trustors can display an aversion to betrayal.  The 
idea of betrayal aversion has been addressed by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004).  They 
experiment with subjects’ decision making in paired trust games played either with 
another person or a computer.  They find that individuals are less willing to “trust” when 
the outcome is determined by another person than when it is determined by random draw 
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by a computer.  This result indicates an aversion to being betrayed by another human 
being, which is referred to as “betrayal aversion” by Bohnet and Zeckhauser.  Bohnet et 
al. (2008) follow the same design to examine whether betrayal aversion is a robust 
feature beyond the United States.  Their results support betrayal aversion as a broad-
based phenomenon across countries.  
We follow this finding and look inversely at the behavior to repay trust.  Since 
betrayal aversion exists, trustees may feel obliged to cooperate, but may not really value 
the outcome generated from cooperation.  This possibly explains our finding that some 
subjects only cooperate when their actions are revealed, since they just want to appear to 
be cooperative, but do not have true concerns for others’ payoffs. 
Our findings can fit into the literature of the “hiding behind some small cake” — 
behavior (Güth et al. 1996).  This result is consistent with previous findings that people 
are more selfish when their behavior is not revealed.  We are not denying that the 
behavior to repay trust may be motivated by distributional concerns or reciprocity.  
However, this possibility may be overstated by results of prior research.  Our work 
suggests a complementary explanation.  Our results suggest that sometimes trustees who 
repay trust may just pretend to be cooperative. 
Experimental Design and Protocol 
We modified the trust game introduced by McCabe and Smith (2000) in our 
experiment.  In the trust game, the first movers who trusts is willing to take the risk of 
losing a certain amount by engaging into the game, anticipating cooperation from the 
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second mover.  The second mover who is reciprocal responds to the first mover’s trust by 
cooperation, which results in a mutually beneficial outcome.  The extensive form of the 
modified trust game is represented in Figure 1.  A first mover (the trustor) can choose a 
sure option (“exit” the game) that gives both movers a payoff of 10, or he can choose to 
trust (or “engage” into the game).  The productivity level of trust is determined by 
nature’s move.2  Fifty percent of the time, nature moves left and yields low-productivity 
trust.  In this case, trust increases the total money payoff from 20 to 30.  Another fifty 
percent of the time, nature moves right which selects high-productivity trust that 
increases the total money payoff from 20 to 50.  After observing nature’s move, a second 
mover (the trustee) has to choose between cooperate with the trust or defect.  Cooperation 
with low-productivity trust gives both movers a payoff of 15, while defecting results in a 
payoff of 0 for the trustor and 30 for the trustee.  Cooperating with high-productivity trust 
ends with a payoff of 25 for both movers, while defecting yields a payoff of 15 for the 
trustor and 35 for the trustee. 
                                                Figure 1. The Modified Trust Game 
                                                 
2
 This design is based on Dufwenberg et al. (2001).  In their experiment the authors varied the multiplier of 
donations, which can either be 2 or 4.   
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Interestingly, when the trustee chooses to cooperate with low-productivity trust, 
the trustor receives the same payoff — a payoff of 15 — as when trust is highly-
productive but the trustee defects.  The trustor knows neither the choice nor the payoff of 
the trustee, unless they are revealed by his own payoff.  The trustor also cannot observe 
nature’s move.  Imagine you are the trustor who receives a payoff of 15.  You may want 
to believe that the trustee chose to cooperate and encountered an unlucky move of nature.  
However, it is also possible that you faced a greedy partner who relied on the presence of 
nature’s move for obfuscation.  Consequently, the trustee’s action is not revealed. 
We experiment with two treatments: (1) the modified trust game; (2) a game 
identical to the modified trust game except that the trustor observes nature’s move at the 
end of the game.  We compare data from these two treatments to capture the effect of the 
concern for betrayal costs.  Compared with treatment 2, the trustee in treatment 1 is able 
to hide betrayal when trust is highly-productive.  Since betrayal is not revealed, the 
trustee may believe that the trustor does not experience betrayal costs.  This belief may 
allow the trustee to justify the choice to defect, and thereby lead to more self-interested 
actions.  
Before the experiment started, the experimenter read the instructions out loud to 
the subjects.  Whether or not betrayal would be revealed was made clear to all subjects.  
After the experiment began, subjects were reminded of whether betrayal would be 
revealed again on the decision screen.  The actual decision screen for trustees in 
treatment 2 is shown below in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Decision Screen for Trustees in Treatment 2 
In both treatments, we implemented the strategy method.  This method allows us 
to observe trustees’ choices for both possible moves of nature even when the trustor 
chooses the sure option.  In each treatment, trustors had to decide whether to trust.  At the 
same time, trustees chose to cooperate or defect for each of the possible moves of nature.  
The earnings of each pair of subjects were determined by choices of both parties and 
nature’s move.  Trustees were informed that their choices were only determinative for the 
final payoff if their paired trustors chose to trust. 
After subjects finished making decisions in each treatment, the experimenter 
flipped a coin to determine nature’s move in the presence of all of the subjects.  The 
difference between the two treatments in the information provided to the subjects was as 
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follows.  In treatment 2, all subjects were informed whether “Heads” on the coin flip 
meant that nature moved left or right.  In treatment 1, only trustees were informed 
whether Heads corresponded to left or right for nature’s move.  
We used a double-blind subject payment protocol in which subjects’ choices are 
anonymous to both other subjects and the experimenter.  This protocol is implemented by 
first asking each subject to select one from a box full of identical, sealed envelopes.  Each 
envelope contains a key with a unique number.  Subjects are asked to use these numbers 
as their (only) identifiers in the experiment.  At the end of the experiment, subjects exit 
the lab individually and collect their earnings in private from a mailbox with a number 
that corresponds to their key number.  Payoffs are contained in sealed envelopes.  
Subjects are asked to exit the building before opening their envelopes.  While waiting for 
pay envelopes to be filled with money and put in the mailboxes, subjects are asked to 
complete a questionnaire on demographic characteristics.  Subjects’ questionnaire 
responses are linked with their decisions by their mailbox key numbers. 
Results 
Subjects who participated in the experiment were recruited from undergraduate 
students at Georgia State University.  A total of 142 subjects participated in the 
experiment, 72 in treatment 1 and 70 in treatment 2.  Subjects earned on average $22.61 
(including a $5 show-up fee).  There were 2 sessions in each treatment.  The treatments 
were implemented with a between-subjects design.  Subjects were randomly assigned to 
one role, either the trustor or the trustee.  Each trustor was randomly paired with a trustee.  
10 
 
 
In each session, subjects played the game only once. Results from the experiment are as 
follows. 
Table 1 reports the frequency of the choice to defect for each treatment.  The 
results are consistent with our hypothesis that subjects choose to defect more frequently 
when betrayal is not revealed.  When nature led to high-productivity trust, 29 out of 36 
trustees in treatment 1 chose to defect, while 23 out of 35 trustees chose to defect in 
treatment 2.  This difference across treatments is weakly significant (z = 1.4122, p-value 
= 0.0789).  The observed difference across treatments provides some support for the 
conjecture that concern for others’ betrayal costs is a motivation for choosing 
cooperation.  
Table 1. Frequencies of the Choice to Defect by Treatment 
 
Sample Size 
 Low-productivity Trust  High-productivity Trust 
 Obs Percent SD  Obs Percent SD 
Treatment 1 36  20 55.56 50.40  29 80.56 40.14 
Treatment 2 35  22 62.86 49.02  23 65.71 48.16 
 
Proportion test across treatment: 
z-test (p-value) 
Total    -0.6258 (0.7343)  1.4122 (0.0789) 
Note: The null hypothesis: difference in behavior across two treatments = 0; the alternative hypothesis: difference in 
behavior across two treatments>0. 
 
When trust was with low productivity, the choice to defect was revealed in both 
treatments.  We did not observe a statistically significant difference in choice of defect 
across treatments.  In treatment 1, 20 out of 36 trustees chose to defect.  In treatment 2, 
22 out of 35 trustees chose to defect.  The difference across treatments is not statistically 
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significant (z = -0.6258, p-value = 0.7343).  This finding of insignificant difference for 
the (trustor-revealing) choices with low-productivity trust, together with the significant 
difference for the (trustor-obscuring) choices with high-productivity trust, provides 
further support for our conjecture that it is trustees’ concern for betrayal costs that 
explains differences between behaviors across treatments. 
Table 2. Probit Regressions of the Choice to Defect 
 
Dependent variable: choice to defect 
Low-productivity Trust High-productivity Trust 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment 0.131 0.098 -0.176* -0.224** 
 (0.121) (0.128) (0.105) (0.109) 
Defect with high-productivity trust 0.333** 0.299**   
 (0.130) (0.138)   
Defect with low-productivity trust   0.267** 0.240** 
   (0.109) (0.114) 
Gender  -0.052  -0.009 
  (0.121)  (0.106) 
Race  -0.211*  -0.119 
  (0.120)  (0.109) 
Experience  -0.033  -0.172 
  (0.148)  (0.140) 
Log Likelihood -44.788 -43.230 -37.206 -35.984 
Pseudo R2 0.0672 0.0997 0.0979 0.1275 
N 71 71 71 71 
Notes: The base treatment is treatment 1. Reporting marginal effects. Standard error in parentheses. ***significant at 
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 2 presents a series of probit regressions on trustees’ decisions to defect.  In 
regressions (1) and (2), we analyze trustees’ decisions when trust is with low 
productivity, while regressions (3) and (4) produce the anaylsis of trustees’ decisions 
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with high-productivity trust.  The right-hand side of the regressions first includes a 
dummy variable “Treatment”, which is equal to one in treatment 2.  Since trustees made 
simultaneous decisions for each possible outcome of nature with the strategy method, 
regressions under low-productivity trust have controls on trustees’ decisions for high-
productivity trust and vice versa.  
Regressions (1) and (3) indicate that trustees only behave differently across 
treatments when trust is highly productive (variable “Treatment”).  Trustees are 17.6% 
less likely to defect in treatment 2 when trust is highly productive and the result is 
statistically significant at 10% level.  However, the treatment does not affect the 
likelihood to defect when betrayal is revealed in both treatment (p-value = 0.284).  
Regressions (2) and (4) include additional subject characteristic variables such as 
“Gender” (female = 1), “Race” (black = 1), and “Experience” (having previous 
experience in other experiments = 1).  Again, we only see behavioral difference across 
treatments when trust is highly-productive.  The coeffient on variable “Treatment” in 
regression (4) is negative and significant at 5% level, suggesting that trustees are 22% 
less likely to defect in treatment 2.  However, regression (2) indicates that when trust is 
with low productivity, there is no treatment effect. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we report results derived from a laboratory experiment based on a 
modified trust game design.  This design allows us to examine whether subjects are more 
selfish when they can hide their selfish actions “behind a coin flip.”  In the modified trust 
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game, we introduce a random coin flip between decisions of trustors and trustees.  The 
realized outcome of coin flip determines the productivity of trust.  By varying trustors’ 
ability to observe the realized outcome of coin flip, we allow trustees to be able to hide 
betrayal in one treatment.  We find a significant increase in the choice to defect when 
trustees can hide betrayal, but no significant behavioral change when betrayal is revealed 
in both treatments.  By backward induction, it is rational for trustors to engage in our 
experiment, with the frequencies of defect reported in the modified trust game.  This 
result supports our hypothesis that subjects may just pretend to be cooperative but do not 
really value the outcome from cooperation.  Our finding suggests that concern for 
betrayal costs influences not only the decision to trust, but also the decision to repay trust. 
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Chapter II: Increasing Organ Donation via Changes in the Default Choice or 
Allocation 
Introduction 
Between 2000 and 2009 the annual number of deceased organ donors within the 
United States (U.S.) increased from 5,985 to 8,022 (Scientific Registry of Transplant 
Recipients (SRTR) 2012).  Although this represents a 34% increase in deceased donors, it 
has not kept pace with the rapidly risen waiting list.  During this same time interval the 
number of patients waiting for an organ transplant has increased from 74,635 to 111,027 
patients, a 49% increase (SRTR 2012).   Both in absolute and relative terms there is an 
ever-increasing gap between the number of deceased donor organs and those waiting for 
a transplant.
3
  Despite the large need for transplantable organs, only 42.7% of residents in 
the U.S. over the age of 18 are registered organ donors.
4
  Clearly, the current organ 
supply system in the United States fails to produce an adequate supply to satisfy the 
demand for transplantable organs and there is an increasing need to close this gap and 
increase human welfare.  In this paper we experimentally investigate whether or not 
changes in the organ donation default choices as well as organ allocation rules can 
effectively increase organ donation and facilitate the closing of this gap. 
The experimental design is inspired by different donor registration and organ 
allocation systems currently applied in other countries.  The U.S. system serves as a 
baseline for comparison where current donor registration is an opt-in program and the 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that the reported deaths while in the waiting list per 1,000 patient years at risks has decreased from 
104.6 in 2000 to 84.5 in 2009 (SRTR 2012).  This is primarily due the advancements in care for these patients and not a 
function of increased transplantation. 
4 Based on the 2012  National Donor Designation Report Card by the Donate Life America at http://donatelife.net/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/DLA-Report-Card-2012-350781.pdf 
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organ allocation system does not assign priority to those who are willing to be donors 
themselves.  We compare this institution to an opt-out donor registration system inspired 
by the current system in Spain and Austria, an opt-in with a priority allocation rule 
inspired by Israel and an opt-out with priority rule system inspired by Singapore.  Our 
results indicate that the opt-out system with priority rule generates the largest donation 
rates, with the largest marginal gains arising from the priority rule allocation system.  Our 
results are consistent with the findings of Kessler and Roth (2012) who found that a 
priority rule allocation program will increase donation rates, but we complement their 
finding to encompass the opt-out rule which is currently being utilized in other countries.    
Although there are a large number of living donors within the U.S., there is 
currently 0.8 living donors for each deceased donor, we focus on deceased donation as 
the number of potential deceased donors is far above the number of current deceased 
donors and many types of organ transplantation rely exclusively on deceased donation.
5
  
Approaches to increase the organ supply from deceased donation broadly fall into two 
classes: improving the donation rates of eligible deceased donors and enlarging the pool 
of potential donors.  The donation rates can be improved by increasing the consent rates 
from the potential donors’ next-of-kin.  Since first drafted in 1968, the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) established that an individual’s statement of intent to be an 
organ donor is legally binding (Bonnie et al. 2008).  However, it is still common practice 
to ask the permission of the deceased’s next-of-kin to donate their organs.  Along this 
vein, the department of Health and Human Service (HHS) passed regulation that requires 
                                                 
5 While a live donor can give a kidney, or a portion of the liver, lung, intestine, or pancreas, it is essentially impossible 
for live donation of solid organs such as the heart, pancreas, and intestinal organs. 
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all hospitals to report all deaths to the Organ Procurement Organization (OPO).
6
  This 
regulation increases the opportunity that the deceased’s next-of-kin is contacted for organ 
donation.   
Policymakers have made efforts to increase the donation rate through regulation 
and improvements to the organ procurement system.  In the U.S. an organ procurement 
organization (OPO) is in charge of the procurement of deceased-donor organs.  There are 
58 such organizations from different regions throughout the U.S. and each regional OPO 
obtains direct contact with the deceased’s next-of-kin.  In April 2003, HHS launched the 
Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative to improve the donation rate.
7
  The goal of 
the collaborative is to encourage the adoption of “best practices” for increasing access to 
transplantable organs.  Recent research suggests that the collaborative has increased 
organ donation within the U.S. (Howard et al. 2007; Shafer et al. 2008).     
Another approach to increase the organ supply is to enlarge the pool of potential 
donors or generating a higher registration rate among the population.  Our experiment is 
targeted at this mechanism for increasing the organ supply as we measure the relative 
effectiveness of potential policy changes that target increasing the number of potential 
donors.  Our paper is novel in that we conduct a controlled lab experiment to compare 
policy regimes under different institutions of organ donor registration that currently exist 
in the world today.  Results from the experiment will inform the discussion of possible 
changes in organ donation public policy.  We consider two highly publicized proposals: 
                                                 
6 This policy was announced in June 1998: http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/1998pres/980617.html 
7 The Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative began in 2003 at the request of HHS Secretary Tommy G. 
Thompson. 
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changing the default rule for organ donor registration and changing the organ allocation 
rule.   
Changing the default rule affects decision-making.  Economists have highlighted 
the substantial role that defaults play in numerous areas, including health care plans 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), automobile insurance (Johnson et al. 1993), 
retirement saving plans (Madrian and Shea 2001) and consent to online privacy policies 
(Johnson et al. 2002).  Results show that people often choose the default option to which 
they are assigned, suggesting that changing the default choice of the organ donation 
question may influence donation decisions.  The U.S. operates an opt-in policy regime so 
that the individual must self-select and register to be an organ donor.  In other words, the 
current default choice in the U.S. is non-donor.  One proposed policy alternative is to 
change the default option to being a donor, what is referred to as an opt-out system.  
Under an opt-out regime, an individual must self-select out of being an organ donor. 
Altering the default choice influences donation decisions through various 
channels (Johnson and Goldstein 2003).  First, the default may be considered as the 
recommended action by the policy-maker.  For example, if the default is that an 
individual has consented to be a donor, potential donors might believe being a donor is 
recommended by policy-makers.  Second, accepting the default may involve less effort 
for the individual making decisions.  Psychologically, the organ donation decision may 
induce stress from thoughts of dying or pain suffered by family members should their 
organs be donated.  Researching the information about organ donation and filling out 
registration forms also involves time and physical effort.  These costs are upfront burdens 
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placed upon organ donor registration and intensified when the default option is non-donor 
(captured by the opt-in rule within our experiment). 
Several European countries like Spain and Austria have adopted an opt-out 
system for organ donation, while some other European countries like Germany and the 
United Kingdom have opt-in default options.  With data reported in Gäbel (2002), 
Johnson and Goldstein (2003; 2004) compare donor registration rates across European 
countries with different default options.  They find higher registration rates in countries 
where the default choice is being a donor (opt-out).   One potential problem of this 
method is the assumption that all other observable characteristics can be controlled for 
and that the unobservable characteristics are not correlated with donor registration across 
countries.  We provide support for these empirical results using a laboratory setting 
where outside confounders do not exist. 
Changing the organ allocation rule is another potential way to increase the pool of 
registered donors.  The current organ allocation system in U.S. is organized by the United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS).  UNOS maintains a national waiting list.  
Transplant candidates on the list are ranked, among other things, according to the 
candidate’s health condition, physical compatibility between the donor and the candidate 
(i.e., the Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) matching),
8
 their distance from the potential 
donor, the patient’s preferences for particular donor types (i.e., is the patient willing to 
accept an Extended Criteria Donor (ECD) organ) and how long the candidate has been on 
the waiting list.  When a transplantable organ becomes available, the opportunity goes to 
                                                 
8 A zero HLA mismatch with a particular donor will automatically move a patient up the waiting queue. 
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the highest-ranked person on the list.  Under the current allocation system utilized by 
UNOS an individual is not given priority if they have elected to be a potential donor.   A 
proposed change is to utilize a priority rule for allocation.
9
   
A priority rule allocation system gives individuals who are on the organ waiting 
list and are registered organ donors precedence for transplantable organs.  In other words, 
the priority rule establishes the top criterion for ranking on the waiting list by whether a 
person is registered as an organ donor or not.  Individuals who are registered donors rank 
higher on the waiting list than those who are not, despite their medical condition or other 
differences.  The supporters of the priority rule believe that the current organ allocation 
system in the U.S. does not provide enough incentive for organ donation because it relies 
purely on altruistic motives.  The priority rule motivates an individual to donate by 
connecting the potential of helping others to the potential of helping one’s self.  The 
results from our experiment validate this motivation. 
Israel and Singapore are examples of countries that have adopted a priority rule 
for their national donation system.  Israel has been using the priority rule system since 
2010 (Lavee et al. 2010).
10
  However, Israeli citizens need to elect to be included as a 
registered donor to receive priority over those not willing to be donors.  Singapore passed 
the Human Organ Transplant Act (HOTA) in 1987, which applies the priority rule with 
                                                 
9 The final decision to utilize an organ is made by the transplant surgeon.  However, changes in the allocation 
mechanism will alter the distribution of organ offers. 
10 The new organ allocation policy was first suggested to the Israel National Transplant Council (INTC) in 2006.  It was 
put into effect in January 2010.  The new policy can be found as the Organ Transplant Law 5768-2008, Israeli Book of 
Laws (English translation provided by the Israeli Ministry of Justice). 
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an opt-out system.
11
  In Singapore, citizens are assumed to be organ donors, but any 
person who objects to HOTA can elect not to be included.  If a person objects to donate 
his organs upon death, he automatically gives up priority for receiving an organ should 
they need one in the future.  Therefore, the policy currently implemented in Singapore 
combines all the features that may increase organ donation over the current U.S. 
paradigm. 
Our experimental design complements the recent work of Kessler and Roth 
(2012).  Kessler and Roth designed a laboratory experiment to test for changes in the 
decision to register as a donor using alterations in the allocation rule (i.e., priority rule) 
and financial incentives (i.e., a rebate and discount).  As mentioned earlier, Kessler and 
Roth illustrate that organ donation rates will increase if one elects to utilize a priority rule 
for organ allocation.  Our research extends this research in two important dimensions. 
One, we investigate whether or not the results expressed in Kessler and Roth (2012) are a 
construct of the neutral framing used in their experiment as the terms “organ” and “organ 
donation” are not used.  Secondly, we investigate whether or not the utilization of an opt-
out versus an opt-in decision rule combined with a priority rule can yield further 
increases in organ donation.  The latter is extremely important as it investigates the 
marginal effects of other countries policies on the organ donation decision.  
Our research can be used to further inform the policy debate surrounding the 
current organ donation system.  We not only compare the alternative policies (opt-out and 
                                                 
11 Details of the HOTA can be found 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3Adb05e985-f8a0-4d61-a906-
9fd39f3b5ac9%20Depth%3A0%20ValidTime%3A02%2F01%2F2011%20TransactionTime%3A31%2F07%2F2005%
20Status%3Ainforce;rec=0#legis 
21 
 
 
priority allocation rules) to the current U.S. donation system, but we also test the relative 
effectiveness of different alternative policies in an effort to decompose their marginal 
effects.  In addition, we further evaluate the combination of the opt-out and priority 
allocation rule.  The opt-out with priority system, as discussed by Breyer and Kliemt 
(2007) and utilized by Singapore, provides a dual-incentive for donation: avoiding the 
cost of opting-out and receiving priority on the waiting list.  A concern with combining 
the opt-out and priority allocation system is that the priority rule cannot prevent the free-
rider problem if the introduction of the opt-out system has already generated sufficient 
organ supply (Breyer and Kliemt 2007).  Investigating this using observational data 
would be infeasible but within our experiment we can investigate whether or not this 
concern is valid.  Our result suggests that the combination of opt-out and priority rule is 
significantly more effective in increasing registration rates than each of the other 
separable policies. 
An additional advancement we make is that the instructions to subjects in our 
experiment are stated in terms of “organs.”  The framing choice that should be applied in 
the experimental study of policy evaluation is controversial (Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt 
2006; Cason and Raymond 2011).  The reason we choose descriptive framing here is that 
we believe the organ donation decision involves significant psychological costs that 
cannot be captured using abstract terms.  To measure the impact of framing on 
experimentally-observed donation decisions, we included an additional treatment, in 
which the instructions are stated in abstract terms.  By doing this, we are able to discuss 
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the impact on the decision to donate “tokens” or donate “organs.”  Our results indicate 
that descriptive framing increases the rate of donor registration. 
In the following section, we present our behavioral hypotheses.  In Section Two, 
we outline the experimental design utilized to investigate our hypotheses on the impact 
that the opt-out versus opt-in and priority allocation rules have on the organ donation 
decision.  In Section Three we discuss the results from the experiment and in the final 
section we summarize our findings. 
Behavioral Hypotheses 
We designed an incentivized laboratory experiment to evaluate the relative 
effectiveness of different organ donation mechanisms.  We adopted a two-by-two design 
illustrated in Table 3 with the dimensions being the opt-in versus opt-out decision rule 
combined with the presence or absence of the priority allocation rule.  
           Table 3. Two-by-Two Experimental Design 
Allocation Rules 
                         Default Options  
Opt-in Opt-out 
Without Priority Rule Control Treatment Opt-out Treatment 
With Priority Rule Priority Treatment Opt-out with Priority Treatment 
The Control treatment models the current status quo of the U.S. donation system, 
where subjects are non-donors by default and no one is granted priority for being a 
registered donor.  The Opt-out treatment is different from the Control treatment only in 
the default choice of the donation decision.  As we discussed, there are costs associated 
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with making an active organ donation decision.  In our experiment, we model these costs 
as a simple monetary cost, which is charged if a subject deviates from the default.  Being 
an organ donor in the Opt-out treatment is less costly than in the Control treatment.  This 
leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, changing the default choice of the donation 
decision from opt-in to opt-out increases the donor registration rate. 
The only difference between the Control treatment and the Priority treatment is 
the organ allocation rule.  In the Priority treatment, subjects who are registered donors 
receive priority when they need an organ, while non-donors are only able to access 
available organs when the needs of the registered donors on the waiting list are satisfied.  
Under the priority rule, donors can jump in front of non-donors on the waiting list.  That 
is, the priority rule increases the probability that donors who need an organ will receive 
one if they are registered donors.  This leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, changing the organ allocation rule by adding 
donors’ priority increases the donor registration rate. 
In addition to comparing each alternative mechanism with the current status quo, 
we are also interested in the relative effectiveness of changing the default choice and 
changing the organ allocation rule.  More formally, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, changing the current status quo to the opt-out 
system yields the same level of increase in the donation rate as changing to the priority 
rule system. 
24 
 
 
The Opt-out with Priority treatment combines the effect of changing both the 
default choice (reducing the cost of donor registration) and changing the organ allocation 
rule (increasing the benefit of donation).  It would be expected that the dual-incentives 
working congruently will be more effective than in the singular case.  There is some 
concern, however, that if the change to an opt-out default choice increases donation 
registration significantly such that individuals are gaining very little from the priority 
allocation rule, then the combination of the policies may not result in higher donation 
rates (Breyer and Kliemt 2007).  In this case, the dual-incentives will not be more 
effective.  We test the following hypothesis on the combination of the opt-out and 
priority allocation rule: 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, changing the default choice and the organ 
allocation rule together generates the same level of increase in the donor registration rate 
as changing only one of them. 
The framing of the decision task may impact the decision to be donor or not 
within the experiment.  An additional advantage of our experiments is the ability to 
formally investigate the framing effect.  We conducted an additional treatment, a neutral 
framing of the Control treatment (opt-in combined without priority), to investigate the 
impact that our contextual framing of the decision process had on subject behavior.  This 
generates our final research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, subjects behave the same when the experiment is 
framed in abstract terms as when the experiment is framed in term of organs. 
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Experimental Design 
There were 30 rounds in each session of the experiment and a finite number of 
periods in each round.  Subjects were unaware of the number of rounds, but they were 
informed at the beginning of the experiment that only one round would be randomly 
selected for payment at the end of the experiment.  Each subject was a virtual human in 
the lab who had one A organ and two B organs.
12
  In each period, subjects had a 10% 
probability of an A organ failure and a 20% probability of a B organ failure (both B 
organs fail together).
13
  If a subject encountered an A organ failure, she ceased to 
participate in that round.  Whenever a subject’s B organs failed, she was placed on a 
waiting list to receive one B organ donated by another subject.
14
  Subjects waiting for a B 
organ were not subjected to the probability of an A organ failure.  Each subject with a B 
organ failure had up to 5 periods to stay on the waiting list.  If they did not receive a B 
organ within this time period, they ceased to participate in that round.  
At the beginning of each round, subjects were asked to make a decision about 
whether they wanted to register as an organ donor (the opt-in rule) or withdraw from the 
donor registry (the opt-out rule).  Since we only focus on the donor registration decision 
not the procurement process, we utilized a strong version of donation in our experiment 
in which registering as a donor implies being a donor upon death in the experiment. 
                                                 
12 Kessler and Roth (2012) have the design of one A units with two B units, where A represents brain and B represents 
kidney.  We keep the consistent design so that the results of our experiment are comparable.  
13 These parameters are identical to those have been used by Kessler and Roth (2012).  We also conducted additional 
sensitivity analyses, discussed in Appendix A, specific to our design to ensure they are appropriate.  
14 The assumption here is that a subject can function normally with one B organ donated by another subject.  This is 
consistent with kidney transplantation practice. 
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Subjects were told that they would earn $3 in each period that they had one active 
A organ and at least one active B organ.  However, subjects were not able to earn any 
money when they were on the waiting list or no longer actively participating in the round.  
All donation decisions were made at the beginning of each period before knowing 
whether or not they would have an organ failure.  All subjects were told that if they chose 
to be a donor and their A organ failed first each of their B organs would be donated to 
one of the subjects who were on the waiting list in that period.  However, if their B 
organs failed first, their active A organ could not be donated.  In addition, if they received 
a B organ from others, the donated B organ could not be donated again.   
There were costs involved with the donation decision.
15
  Subjects were told that 
they had to pay $0.75 to make an active donation decision (override the default choice).  
This cost can be thought as the psychological and physical costs associate with overriding 
the default choice, which was charged regardless of the donation outcome.  Subjects were 
also told that the act of donating organs would cost them $2.25.  This donation cost can 
be thought as the psychological costs of organ procurement.  Thus, one’s payoff for each 
round is equal to the earnings in that round minus the costs they incurred for overriding 
the default decision as well as donating organs.  At the end of the experiment, only one 
round was randomly selected for payment.  Subjects were told at the beginning of the 
experiment that if in the selected round their payoff was negative the extra costs would be 
charged from their $10 show-up fee.   
                                                 
15 The true costs associated with organ donation cannot be measured.  Here we impose these costs merely to model the 
incentives involved in organ donation.  Since the costs vary as the default choice changes, we divide the costs into two 
parts, the cost of overriding the default and the cost of donation.  
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Figure 3. Illustration of the Decision Screen Used in the Experiment 
After making the donation decision at the beginning of each round, subjects 
observed their outcome for each period, their earnings each period, and their accumulated 
earnings for that round.  After experiencing a B organ failure, the subject began to 
receive the waiting list information.  The waiting list information provide subjects with 
information on how many periods they had been waiting, their rank on the waiting list 
and whether they received a B organ in that period.  A screenshot of the information 
screen presented to the subjects is shown in Figure 3.  Subjects who ceased to participate 
in the round were not able to observe any more information until a new round started. 
To investigate our five experimental hypotheses we conducted four organ-framed 
treatments ― the Control treatment, the Opt-out treatment, the Priority treatment and the 
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Opt-out with Priority treatment ― and one neutral-framed treatment.16  In the following, 
we provide more detail on the five different treatments used in the experiment. 
In the Control treatment, subjects were not organ donors by default.  Those who 
wished to register as donors were charged $0.75 to change their status.  Subjects were 
told that being an organ donor might potentially affect others’ earnings.  The donation 
decision was described in the experiment as follows: 
“In this round, you are not an organ donor by default.  If you 
want to change your status to be a donor, please check the box 
below; otherwise, please leave it empty. 
□ I hereby agree to donate my organs after I cease to 
participate in this round.” 
Subjects were also told that if they chose to be an organ donor, after their A organ 
failed, their active B organs would be donated to those in need in the order of their rank 
on the waiting list.  The rank on the waiting list was determined by the length of time the 
subjects had been waiting for a B organ.  Subjects who had been waiting longer were 
ranked higher.
17
  The rank of subjects who had the same waiting time was randomly 
determined.  For example, if there were two subjects on the waiting list and subject 1 had 
been waiting for 4 periods and subject 2 had been waiting for 3 periods, subject 1 ranked 
higher than subject 2. 
                                                 
16 A copy of the experiment instructions for each of the five treatments can be obtained from the corresponding author. 
17 The ordering of subjects on the waiting list implicitly assumes that all the subjects are homogeneous with regard to 
their patient-specific characteristics that might impact their status in the queue in the real world.  This is a necessary 
abstraction so that we can focus on the treatment effects within our experiment. 
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In the Opt-out treatment, subjects were registered organ donors by default.  Those 
who wished to withdraw their donor registry were charged $0.75 to opt out.  The choice 
of this treatment was described as follows: 
“In this round, you are an organ donor by default.  If you want 
to change your status to be a non-donor, please check the box 
below; otherwise, please leave it empty. 
□ I hereby object to donate my organs after I cease to 
participate in this round.” 
Unless a subject responded that he or she did not want to be considered a potential 
organ donor, their active B organs were donated after an A organ failure occurred.  
Organs were provided to those in need according to their rank on the waiting list.  
Subjects on the waiting list were ranked by the length of time they had been waiting on 
the list, and subjects who had been waiting longer were ranked higher. 
The Priority treatment is different from the Control treatment only in the ranking 
rule used for the waiting list.  In this treatment, the default option for the donation 
decision was not to be an organ donor.  Before making the donation decision, all subjects 
were informed that those who chose to be an organ donor would be given priority ranking 
on the waiting list.  Therefore, subjects on the waiting list in this treatment were ranked 
on the basis of two criteria: first their donation decision, and second the length of time 
they had been waiting on the list.  For example, if subject 1 is a non-donor who had been 
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waiting for 4 periods and subject 2 is a registered donor who had been waiting for 3 
periods, subject 2 ranked higher than subject 1. 
The Opt-out with Priority treatment is different from the Control treatment in 
both the default option and the ranking rule on the waiting list.  In this treatment, subjects 
were registered organ donors by default.  Before making the donation decision, all 
subjects were informed that those who withdraw their donor registration would 
automatically give up their priority ranking on the waiting list.  Transplantable organs 
would be provided to registered donors before non-donors. 
The description of the decision environment to the subjects in the four treatments 
above was stated in terms of organ donations.  We conducted an additional treatment ― 
the Neutral treatment, in which the instructions to subjects were neutrally-framed, to 
control the effect of the experiment framing. 
In the Neutral treatment, we adopted the same default option and ranking rule on 
the waiting list as the Control treatment.  The only difference is that the experiment 
description was phrased in abstract terms, not in terms of organs.  Subjects were informed 
that they would be assigned three tokens in each round: one A token and two B tokens.  
In each period, each subject had a 10% probability of losing their A token and a 20% 
probability of losing both B tokens.  Subjects would earn $3 in each period that they had 
one A token and at least one B token.  The donation decision in this treatment was 
described as follows: 
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 “In this round, you are not a donor by default.  If you want to 
change your status to be a donor, please check the box below; 
otherwise, please leave it empty. 
□ I hereby agree to donate my B tokens after I cease to 
participate in this round.” 
We conducted eighteen experimental sessions with 15 subjects in each session.  In 
twelve sessions, subjects played 15 rounds in one of the organ-framed treatments 
followed by 15 rounds in another one of the organ-framed treatments (for example, 
subjects participated in the Control treatment for rounds 1-15 and then the Opt-out 
treatment for rounds 16-30).  In these sessions, subjects were stopped after round 15 and 
told that they would start a new treatment.
18
  Subjects were handed the instructions for 
the new treatment and the experimenter clearly explained all changes in the rules. 
In three of the remaining sessions, subjects played the Control treatment in all 30 
rounds, while in the last three treatments subjects played the Neutral treatment in all 30 
rounds.  In these sessions, subjects were also stopped after round 15.  They were told that 
they would start a new treatment, but there were no changes in the rules of the game.  The 
experimenter again reviewed all the rules of the game.  All of the treatment combinations 
used in the experiment are shown in Table 4.  Lastly, the selection of which session to 
conduct among the eighteen sessions was randomly determined prior to subjects entering 
the experiment laboratory.  
                                                 
18
 Subjects experienced a break after round 15, so that we had the same group of subjects that played in two 
different treatments. 
32 
 
 
Table 4. Number of Sessions for Each Treatment Combination 
Treatment 
Rounds 1-15 
Treatment Rounds 16-30 
Control Opt-out Priority 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
Neutral 
Control 3 Sessions 1 Session 1 Session 1 Session 
No 
Sessions 
Opt-out 1 Session 
No 
Sessions 
1 Session 1 Session 
No 
Sessions 
Priority 1 Session 1 Session 
No 
Sessions 
1 Session 
No 
Sessions 
Opt-out with 
Priority 
1 Session 1 Session 1 Session No Sessions 
No 
Sessions 
Neutral 
No 
Sessions 
No 
Sessions 
No 
Sessions 
No Sessions 3 Sessions 
At the end of each session, the subjects were presented with a brief questionnaire 
on their demographic characteristics and their involvement with organ donation in their 
own lives.  They received payment after they completed the questionnaire. 
Results 
The experiment was performed at the Georgia State University Experimental 
Economics Center (ExCEN).  Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student 
body using a recruiting program that randomly invites registered subjects to participate in 
the experiment.  A total of 270 subjects participated in the experiment and the average 
payment was $18.03.
19
  Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the experiment.  
There are 8100 observations at the subject-round level.  The average donor registration 
rate for all treatments is 41.5%.  The average donation rates by treatment were as follows: 
                                                 
19 The experiment was conducted using the experimental software z-Tree 3.3.6 (Fishbacher 2007). 
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Opt-out with Priority (70.8%), Priority (61.3%), Opt-out (48.8%), Control (25.3%), and 
Neutral (17.8%).  The descriptive statistics clearly indicate that the highest average 
donation rates arise when the priority rule is utilized.  This finding is consistent with that 
of Kessler and Roth (2012), but the descriptive statistics also illustrate that substantial 
gains can be achieved using just an opt-out policy.   
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the Experiment 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Round Profit 8100 9.216 9.83 -3 87 
Round Cost 8100 0.582 0.90 0 3 
Payment 8100 18.033 9.28 7 63.25 
Flier 8100 0.211 0.41 0 1 
Donation Registration Rate 8100 0.415 0.49 0 1 
      Control Treatment 
     Donation Registration Rate 2700 0.253 0.43 0 1 
      Opt-out Treatment 
     Donation Registration Rate 1350 0.488 0.50 0 1 
      Priority Treatment 
     Donation Registration Rate 1350 0.613 0.49 0 1 
      Opt-out with Priority Treatment 
     Donation Registration Rate 1350 0.708 0.45 0 1 
      Neutral Treatment 
     Donation Registration Rate 1350 0.178 0.38 0 1 
      
Figure 4 shows the percentage of subjects who were registered organ donors 
(those who either opted in or did not opt out) in each round of the experiment for each 
treatment.  The line breaks indicate that subjects were stopped after round 15 in each 
session and then restarted under a new treatment from round 16 through 30.  Figure 4 
suggests that changing the default option and/or altering the organ allocation rule has a 
significant positive impact on the donor registration rate across all 30 rounds.  The 
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Control treatment lies beneath the three other organ-framed treatments regardless of 
being played in the first or last 15 rounds.  Figure 4 also suggests that the experiment 
framing plays an important role.  The organ-framed treatment generates a higher average 
donor registration rate than the neutral-framed treatment.  This difference in registration 
rate across treatments is even more notable in the last 15 rounds. 
  
Figure 4. Percent of Donors in Each Treatment Reported by Round of the Experiment 
To more rigorously investigate the treatment differences a series of Wilcoxon 
rank-sum tests were conducted comparing the donation decisions of subjects across 
treatments.  Table 6 illustrates the results from these tests.  The test statics are conducted 
using three different data partitions.  The first pools all of the data across rounds, the 
second focuses on the first 15 rounds in the experiment and the third partition analyzes 
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the last 15 rounds.  The results from all of the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests clearly indicate 
that the donation decisions across treatments are statistically different from one another.  
They are also consistent with the observation that the donation rate is highest in the Opt-
out with Priority treatment and the lowest is the Neutral treatment. 
Table 6. Wilcoxon Rank-sum Tests 
 
 Test Statistic 
Treatment 
 
Treatment  Pooled Data Rounds 1-15 Rounds 16-30 
Control vs Opt-out  -14.988*** -11.493*** -9.713*** 
Control vs Priority  -22.309*** -13.895*** -17.680*** 
Control vs Opt-out with Priority  -27.818*** -19.491*** -19.897*** 
Control vs Neutral  5.376*** 2.362** 5.431*** 
Opt-out vs Priority  -6.498*** -2.141** -7.036*** 
Opt-out vs Opt-out with Priority  -11.656*** -7.402*** -9.102*** 
Priority vs Opt-out with Priority  -5.241*** -5.298*** -2.121** 
Note: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, * significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 7. Probit Regressions on the Decision to be a Donor or Not within the Experiment 
Probit Estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Opt-out 0.249*** 0.269*** 0.258*** 0.248*** 0.252*** 
 
(0.016) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Priority 0.365*** 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.311*** 0.315*** 
 
(0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Opt-out with Priority 0.451*** 0.450*** 0.437*** 0.428*** 0.431*** 
 
(0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Neutral -0.098*** -0.058** -0.055** -0.055** -0.052** 
 
(0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Second Treatment 
 
-0.058*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.065*** 
  
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Second×Opt-out 
 
-0.038 -0.030 -0.029 -0.023 
  
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Second×Priority 
 
0.094*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.100*** 
  
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Second×Opt-out with Priority 
 
0.005 0.014 0.010 0.014 
  
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Second×Neutral 
 
-0.091** -0.093** -0.088** -0.085** 
  
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
Earnings Last Round 
  
0.003*** 0.001* 0.001* 
   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Received an Organ Last Round 
   
0.047** 0.047** 
    
(0.021) (0.021) 
Organ Benefit Last Round 
   
0.003* 0.003* 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
Male 
    
0.011 
     
(0.012) 
White 
    
0.076*** 
     
(0.019) 
Donor in Real Life 
    
0.050*** 
     
(0.012) 
      N 8100 8100 7830 7830 7801 
Chi2 1375.02 1425.66 1388.24 1416.61 1466.78 
Pseudo R2 0.1250 0.1297 0.1306 0.1333 0.1385 
Note: All variables are expressed as marginal values.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** significant at the 1% 
level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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We additionally conducted a series of probit regressions to investigate the 
marginal effect of different mechanisms on organ donation decisions.  The results are 
illustrated in Table 7.  The independent variables in the probit regressions include the 
four treatment dummy variables Opt-out, Priority, Opt-out with Priority, and Neutral 
corresponding with the different cells of the experimental design (Model 1).  The 
reference group is the donation decision in the Control treatment, which is the opt-in 
system currently used in the U.S.  We further control whether a decision is made in the 
first 15 rounds or in last 15 rounds of the experiment using a dummy variable interaction 
term (Model 2).  The dummy variable Second Treatment equals to 1 if a treatment is 
played in the last 15 rounds and it is interacted with the four primary treatment dummies 
in Model 1.  Regression Models 3 and 4 control for the effect of information in the 
previous round on the current donor registration decision.  Earnings Last Round 
represents earnings from the previous round (Model 3).  Received an Organ Last Round 
is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the subject received an organ donated by others in 
the previous round.  Organ Benefit Last Round captures the earnings from the previous 
round after receiving an organ (Model 4).  Lastly, regression Model 5 includes 
demographic control variables Male, White, and Donor in Real Life.  The latter is a 
dummy variable indicating that the subject is currently a registered organ donor.   
Focusing on our first research hypothesis the results for the experiment validate 
our hypothesis that the opt-out rule generates a higher donor registration rate than the opt-
in rule.  Figure 4 illustrates that the opt-out rule has a significant positive impact on the 
donor registration rate in all rounds.  Across all rounds, the Opt-out treatment has an 
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average donation rate of 48.8%, which is almost twice the average donation rate of 25.3% 
in the Control treatment.  Over the first 15 rounds, the Opt-out treatment had an average 
donation rate of 53.8%, while the Control treatment had a much lower average rate of 
27.7%.  Over rounds 16-30, the Opt-out treatment had a rate of 43.9%, while the Control 
treatment only had a rate of 22.9%.  Results from the non-parametric tests in Table 6 are 
consistent with the observation that the Control treatment had a statistically significant 
lower donor registration rate than the Opt-out treatment regardless of being played in the 
first or last 15 rounds.  The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are -14.988, -11.493 and -9.713 for 
pooled data, first 15 rounds and last 15 rounds of the experiment respectively when 
comparing the Control treatment with the Opt-out treatment. 
The probit regressions in Table 7 also support our first research hypothesis.  The 
positive and highly statistically significant coefficient on the Opt-out dummy variable in 
regression Model 1 indicates that subjects are about 25% more likely to register as a 
donor in the Opt-out treatment than in the Control treatment across all 30 rounds.  
Furthermore, this finding is robust to the additional controls used in the other 
econometric specifications (Models 2 through 5).  This represents an almost 100% 
increase in the donor registration rate over the 25.3% donor registration rate observed in 
the Control treatment. This finding suggests that a significant increase in the donation 
rate can be achieved by just introducing the opt-out rule.  
In order to test our second research hypothesis we must compare the Control 
treatment (the baseline opt-in without priority system) with the Priority treatment as well 
as the Opt-out treatment with the Opt-out with Priority treatment.  A statistically 
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significant and higher donor registration rate for the Priority and Opt-out with Priority 
treatments, relative to the Control and Opt-out treatments respectively, will support our 
second research hypothesis.  Figure 4 illustrate that the Priority treatment has a higher 
average donor registration rate than the Control treatment in all rounds.  The average 
donation rate for the Priority treatment is 61.3% over all rounds, 59.6% over the first 15 
rounds, and 63.0% over the last 15 rounds.  A higher donation rate is also observed in the 
Opt-out with Priority treatment when compared to the Opt-out treatment.  The average 
donation rate for this treatment was 70.8% over all rounds, 73.2% for the first 15 rounds 
and 68.4% for last 15 rounds. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests also demonstrate that the Control treatment 
generates statistically significantly lower donor registration rates than the Priority 
treatment over all rounds as well as in rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 separately.  The test 
statistics are -22.309, -13.895, and -17.680 when comparing the Control treatment with 
the Priority treatment for all the rounds, rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 respectively.  The 
results comparing the Opt-out treatment with the Opt-out with Priority treatment are 
similar to those observed when comparing the Control treatment with the Priority 
treatment; adding the priority allocation rule increases the rate of organ donation.  The 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistics are -11.656, -7.402 and -9.102 when comparing the 
total rounds, rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30 respectively.  This said, the marginal 
differences between the Opt-out treatment and the Opt-out with Priority treatment are not 
as large as the marginal differences between the Control treatment and the Priority 
treatment.  The donor registration rate increased by 45% going from the Opt-out 
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treatment to the Opt-out with Priority treatment whereas it increased by 142% going from 
the Control treatment to the Priority treatment. 
The probit results also illustrate the treatment differences as the statistically 
significant and positive coefficient on Priority indicates that the donation rate increases 
by between 31.5% and 36.5%, depending on the model assumptions.  The statistically 
significant and positive coefficient on Opt-out with Priority indicates that the donation 
rate increases by between 42.8% and 45.1%, depending on the model assumptions.  Both 
of these coefficients are interpreted relative to the Control treatment so the relative gains 
observed under the Opt-out with Priority treatment must be purged of the Opt-out effect 
solely to be comparable to the Control versus Priority treatment.  Both of these results 
are consistent with those observed in Kessler and Roth (2012) as it is clearly evident that 
changing the allocation rule to a priority rule will increase the donor registration rate.  
This said, these comparisons do raise the question of whether or not just using the Opt-
out rule is capable of providing a similar gain as that observed when altering the 
allocation rule.  This is more formally investigated under our third research hypothesis.  
Our previous research hypotheses have illustrated that altering either the organ 
allocation rule, using a priority rule system, or the default choice, going from an Opt-in to 
an Opt-out program, will increase the organ donor registration rate.  The results from our 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests as well as the probit regressions clearly indicate that the organ 
donation rate is greater when comparing either the Opt-out treatment or the Priority 
treatment with the Control (opt-in) treatment.  From a public policy perspective it may be 
of interest whether or not the relative gains are comparable, as both policies require 
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different forms of administrative change that may or may not be more palatable for 
different administrations and the populous.  On average going from the Control treatment 
to the Opt-out treatment increased the organ donation rate from 25.3% to 48.8% whereas 
going to the Priority treatment increased it to 61.3%.  This provides the first evidence 
that does not support our third research hypothesis that they generate equivalent marginal 
gains in the organ donor rate.  Our regression results further confirm this observation.  
Comparing the coefficient on the Opt-out treatment with the Priority treatment illustrates 
that in all the models estimated the Priority treatment coefficient is statistically 
significant and greater than the Opt-out treatment coefficient (p<0.01).  Therefore, our 
third research is not supported.  However, it is important to note that changing the default 
choice, going from an Opt-in to an Opt-out system, is able to generate approximately 
80% of the gains achievable when altering the allocation rule.  Therefore, although it is 
not a one-to-one equivalent the gains are significant enough that policy makers may wish 
to consider changing just the default option versus the allocation rule if changing the 
default option is a more palatable public policy. 
Investigating our third research hypothesis illustrated that sizable gains are 
achievable by changing either the allocation rule or the default choice, with the allocation 
rule outperforming the default choice by a small margin.  Our fourth research hypothesis 
investigates whether or not using either of these changes in isolation yields the same 
result as combining them and utilizing an Opt-out with Priority program.  Figure 4 
clearly illustrates that Opt-out with Priority treatment outperforms both the Opt-out 
treatment and the Priority treatment separately, as it generated the highest donation rate 
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of all the treatments.  This does not support our fourth research hypothesis, as it is clear 
that combining both changes exceeds either of them individual.  Over all the rounds the 
average donation rate was 70.8% for the Opt-out with Priority treatment, compared with 
48.8% and 61.3% observed under the Opt-out and Priority treatments respectively.  This 
is also true when comparing the results from rounds 1-15 and rounds 16-30.  Over the 
first 15 rounds, the Opt-out with Priority treatment had an average donation rate of 
73.2%, while the Opt-out treatment was 53.8% and the Priority treatment was 59.6%.  
Over the last 15 rounds, the Opt-out with Priority treatment had an average donation rate 
of 68.4% while the Opt-out treatment was 43.9% and the Priority treatment was 63.0%. 
 The non-parametric tests indicate that the Opt-out with Priority treatment 
outperforms all the other treatments and that the results are statistically significant.  The 
tests also show that the Opt-out with Priority treatment generates statistically 
significantly higher donation registration rates than all the other treatments regardless if 
they are played first (rounds 1-15) or last (rounds 16-30).  The test statistics comparing 
the Opt-out treatment and the Priority treatment with the Opt-out with Priority treatment 
concretely invalidates our fourth research hypothesis, as it evidences that in all cases the 
combined effect of the Opt-out with Priority treatment exceeds the constituent changes 
separately.  Results from the probit regressions in Table 7 are also consistent with this 
observation.  The coefficient on Opt-out with Priority in regression (1) is positive and 
highly statistically significant, representing that subjects are about 45% more likely to 
donate in the Opt-out with Priority treatment than in the Control treatment. Using 
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estimates from regression (1), we find that Opt-out with Priority also performs better than 
either Opt-out (p<0.01) or Priority (p<0.01) treatments separately. 
As mentioned earlier, our experiment is fundamentally different from Kessler and 
Roth’s (2012) experiment as it investigates the separable and combined effects of 
changing the allocation rule as well as the default option and it contextualizes the 
decision environment.  Our fifth and final research hypothesis investigates whether or not 
the abstract and contextual framing generates the same donor registration rates.   Our 
experimental results indicate that the contextual framing leads to a larger donor 
registration rate than a neutral framing.  Evidence of this can be seen in Figure 4, where 
the neutral framing donation rates are on average lower than those observed in the 
contextual framing treatment.  However, the differences are not as clear over rounds 1-15 
as they are over rounds 16-30. 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests and the probit regression results clarify this 
treatment effect.  The non-parametric tests demonstrate that the Control treatment 
generates statistically significantly higher donor registration rates than the Neutral 
treatment.  This result is still statistically significant for all rounds and if we only focus 
on the first 15 rounds or the last 15 round; the test statistics are 5.376, 2.362 and 5.431 for 
the respective partitions of the data.  The parametric tests estimate the likelihood of 
donation in each treatment.  The significant negative coefficient on Neutral in regression 
Model 1 indicates that subjects are about 10% less likely to register as a donor in the 
neutral-framed treatment than in the organ-framed treatment across all 30 rounds.  When 
controlling for other covariates in the experiment, Models 2 through 5, this percentage 
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decreases to around 5%.  Therefore, using a neutral framing, as was conducted by Kessler 
and Roth (2012), will generate a lower rate of donor registration. 
Robustness of Results 
Table 7 also report results from probit regressions with controls for order effects, 
information from the previous round and demographic controls.  Results are qualitatively 
the same when we add additional controls.  Regression (2) includes a control variable 
Second Treatment and its interactions with the treatment variables.  The significant 
negative coefficient on Second Treatment shows that subjects are 6% less likely to 
register when they played the Control treatment in the last 15 rounds.  The significant 
positive coefficient on the interaction term Second×Priority indicate that the Priority 
treatment has an even stronger impact on the registration rate when it was played after 
subjects have participated in another organ-framed treatment. 
Regression (3) controls for the effect of earnings in the previous round on donor 
registration.  The significant positive coefficient on Earnings Last Round suggests 
earnings in the previous round have a positive impact on the donation decision.  Although 
subjects played multiple rounds in the experiment, only one round was randomly selected 
for payment at the end of each session.  Subjects’ donation decisions should not be 
affected by their previous earnings.  However, subjects could get information about 
others’ donation decision through receiving a B organ when needed in a previous period 
of the experiment.  We further included variables Received an Organ Last round and 
Organ Benefit Last Round in regression (4).  The significant positive coefficient on 
Received an Organ Last Round shows that subjects are 5% more likely to donate if they 
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received a B organ in the previous round.  Since receiving a B organ leads to additional 
earnings, especially earnings after receiving a B organ in the previous round, this may 
affect the likelihood of donation.  The coefficient on Organ Benefit Last Round is 
positive and significant at 10% level. This indicates that the longer one remains active 
after receiving a donated organ (resulting in higher earnings that round), the greater the 
probability they will be a subsequent donor.  Regression (5) controls for demographic 
information of the subjects.  Among our selected subjects, whites are 8% more likely to 
register as a donor than all non-white races.  Subjects who were self-reported as organ 
donor in real life are 5% more like to register as a donor.  These two results are 
statistically significant. 
Conclusion 
A fundamental limitation to the success of transplantation-based medical 
treatments is the supply of organs.  Although there have been sizeable gains in the 
development of immunosuppressant drugs that have increased the pool of potential 
candidates for a donated organ, there still exists an ever widening gap between the 
number of organ donors and the number of patients on the waiting list.  Recently, the 
transplantation community has made sizable gains in the utilization of donated organs 
(Howard et al. 2007; Shafer et al. 2008), but future changes in public policy may be 
required to increase the rate of organ donation within the United States in order to save 
more lives.  Drawing from the experiences in other countries, changes in public policy 
can arise from either changing the allocation rule to provide priority for those who are 
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registered donors or from changing the default choice from a standard opt-in to an opt-out 
system.  Furthermore, as is the case in Singapore, it is possible to combine both changes 
in the allocation rule and default choice.  The results from our experiment provide the 
first rigorous investigation of changing both the allocation rules and default choice 
separately as well as jointly. 
Our results are consistent with those previously observed in Kessler and Roth 
(2012), in that changing the allocation rule to a priority rule system yields a sizable 
increase in the organ donation rate.  We further extend this finding to illustrate that the 
priority rule generates a larger marginal gain than altering the default choice from an opt-
in to an opt-out public policy.  In addition, we find that combining both an opt-out and 
priority rule policy will provide the largest gains in the organ donation rate and that gains 
are substantially different from the individual effect of each public policy change.  We 
further find evidence that the context of the experiment used to investigate the organ 
donation decision does matter with a contextualized decision environment yielding an 
increase in organ donation rates of around 5%. 
An important public policy finding that our results illustrate is that approximately 
80% of the gains observed under a priority allocation rule are achievable by switching 
from an opt-in to an opt-out public policy.  This is extremely important from a public 
policy perspective as the costs, both pecuniary and psychological, associated these two 
possible changes may be substantially different.  A change in the allocation rule redefines 
the rules of whom is to receive priority for an organ which post-transplantation may 
invoke concepts of fairness and equality as enforcement of this rule may still rely on the 
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deceased donors next-of-kin being amenable to their deceased’s donation preferences.  
On the other hand, an opt-out policy redefines the rule of who owns a deceased’s 
individuals organs from the next-of-kin to the government.  The choice of which option is 
more appropriate is subject to the policy maker’s discretion and the constituents that they 
represent.  
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Chapter III: Improving the Approach to Organ Donor Registration 
Introduction 
Numerous lives with organ failure could be saved by organ transplants.  In the 
United States, deceased donors supply the majority of transplanted organs.  Based on data 
from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), about 78% of U.S. 
organ transplants performed in 2012 were from decreased donors.
 20
  Despite the large 
need for deceased donor organs (over 120,000 people are currently waiting for a life-
saving transplantable organ), only 42.7% of residents over the age of 18 in the United 
States are registered organ donors (Donate Life America 2012).
21
  Since 1995, over 
111,000 people on a waiting list to receive an organ have died.
22
  Clearly, the current 
donor registration system fails to produce enough potential deceased donors to satisfy the 
large organ demand. 
This paper proposes to improve donor registry by adding a persuasive message 
with the registration request.  A persuasive message is a request for action when it is 
supposed that the recipient maybe reluctant or unaware.  In this paper, I consider a 
persuasive message enhancing the benefits of organ donation, such as how many lives 
can be saved by one deceased organ donor.
23
  In the United States, an individual who 
                                                 
20
 Based on OPTN data as of May 17, 2013, around 21,000 organ transplants performed in 2012 were from decreased 
donors. 
21 
Waiting list numbers are based on Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) data as of April 27, 
2012. Registration rate is reported by statistics of Donate Life America. 
22 
Based on OPTN Death Removals Data as of May 10, 2013. 
23 
One deceased donor who can donate multiple organs (heart, lung, kidneys, pancreas and intestine) and tissues 
(cornea, bone, skin, heart valves, tendons, veins, etc.) has the potential to save as many as 50 lives through organ and 
tissue donation. 
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wishes to be a deceased donor can register through the department of motor vehicles in 
his state of residence.  The request for donor registration is commonly simple; an 
individual can either check a “Yes” box following a generic question such as “Do you 
wish to register to be an organ and tissue donor?”, or leave it empty.  I experimentally 
investigate whether supplementing this generic question with a persuasive message 
increases donor registration rate.  
The message proposal is inspired by the evidence of the effectiveness of 
persuasive messages on charity fundraising and healthy behavior promotion.  Just as the 
organ donation, many charity organizations are experiencing a shortage in donations as 
the result of an economic downturn.  This leads to the literature in fundraising that studies 
the effectiveness of persuasive messages on promoting donations.  One key factor of the 
persuasive message in order to motivate donation is that it carries evidence that increases 
the perceived value of the Charity goal, and therefore motivates donation (Das et al., 
2008).  Burt and Strongman (2004) used the method of psychological questionnaire to 
examine the effect of including image evidence within the donation request on donations.  
The authors find that using image of children is particularly powerful to motivate 
donations, and image of children showing negative emotions generates even stronger 
emotional reactions among potential donors.   Another closely related work by Chou and 
Murnigham (2013) investigates how the persuasive message influences decisions on 
blood donation.  The authors conducted a field experiment through the collaboration of 
the Red Cross, where messages about blood donation across different frames (“save a 
life” versus “prevent a death”) and urgency level (“urgent needs” versus “moderate 
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needs”) was emailed to 19 undergraduate residential groups at the Northwestern 
University.  They find that among their selected subjects, those who received “prevent a 
death” emails were more likely to donate, while emails indicating “urgent needs” did not 
generate more donors.  Jeong et al. (2011) further suggest that gain/loss-framed messages 
have different effect on audience with different dispositional motivation (approach-
oriented versus avoidance-oriented) and charity appeals should be tailored according to 
the motivational dynamics of the target audience.  An organ donation related work by 
Anker and Feeley (2011) focuses on the usage of messages in obtaining donation consent.  
The authors studied 15 specific messages across 4 domain areas and find the content of 
request message is associated with familial consent. 
Within the health domain, persuasive messages have been found to be effective to 
improve health practice.  Morman (2000) investigates whether a persuasive message can 
motivate men to begin regular performance of the testicular self-exam (TSE) in order to 
detect testicular cancer.  The author finds that a fear message can educate individuals 
about the threat of diseases and motivate them to perform TSE on a regular basis.  
Rothman and Salovey (1997) proposed that how a message is framed alter a message’s 
persuasive impact on different health behaviors. A loss-framed message is more 
persuasive when developing initiatives to promote detective behaviors, while a gain-
framed message is more effective when targeting prevention behaviors.  Rothman et al. 
(1999) further conducted two psychological experiments which provide empirical support 
to the theoretical framework by Rothman and Salovey (1997).  The two experiments 
investigate the framework in the context of both hypothetical and real health problems.  
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Their results directly confirm the relation between message framing and health behaviors 
predicted by Rothman and Salovey (1997).  
There are a number of reasons why such a persuasive message may increase the 
number of registered organ donors.  First, it may educate potential donors of the value of 
organ donation and make them more knowledgeable.  Knowledge about organ donation 
has been shown to be significantly associated with the behavioral intent to register as a 
donor (Morgan and Miller, 2002).  This relation is also evidenced in the context of 
educational policy interventions that aims to increase intention to be organ donors (Quinn 
et al., 2006; Thornton et al., 2012). 
Second, a persuasive message could create an emotional connection between the 
audience and the recipient in need of their help.  For instance, it evokes empathy that 
makes the audience perceive more of themselves in others who are in need of help, and 
therefore can increase helping behavior (Cialdini et al., 1997). 
Third, this message addresses the likelihood that the goal of charity can be 
attained ― one donor may potentially save as many as 50 lives.  Individuals are not 
likely to donate unless they believe donating could help solve the problem and reach the 
charity goal (Das, Kerkhof, and Kuiper, 2008).  Donations are more likely when there is 
evidence that the charity goal can be achieved, such as the charity organization is 
perceived to be effective (Sargeant, West, and Ford, 2004), or the information that others 
contribute as well (Sell and Wilson, 1991; Croson and Marks, 1998; Clark, 2002).  This 
leads us to the hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis: Changing the content of the donor registration request ― by 
including a persuasive message about the benefits of organ donation ― increases the 
registration rate. 
I examined the hypothesis by using a laboratory experimental method.  The basic 
design bears similarity to Li, Hawley, and Schnier (2013), where subjects played virtual 
lives and the only decision is to choose whether or not to be an organ donor.  I kept 
consistent experimental parameters and implementation with Li, Hawley, and Schnier 
(2013), since I combined part of their data into my data analysis.  Subjects started each 
round of the experiment with a donor registration decision.  In a control treatment, 
subjects faced a standard registration request inspired by the current donor registration 
request applied in the United States.  This is compared to an information treatment where 
the request includes a persuasive message highlights the value of donation.  The 
persuasive message is shown to have a positive impact on donation decisions in the early 
rounds of the experiment.  Subjects are about 13 percent more likely to register as a 
donor in round 1 of the information treatment than the control treatment.  The results also 
indicate that the information treatment affects donation decisions in the experiment 
mainly among subjects who are not organ donors in real life, while the treatment effect is 
very small for those who are self-reported organ donors.  Subjects who are non-donors in 
real life are about 21 percent more likely to register as a donor in the experiment when 
they are provided with persuasive messages.   
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This paper proceeds as follows.  The following section outlines the experimental 
design utilized in this study.  Section Three represents the results from the experiment.  
The final section concludes the paper. 
Experimental Design 
In the experimental design, each subject lives a virtual life where the only 
decision is to be an organ donor or not.   The description of the experiment in the 
instructions to subjects was stated in terms of organ donations.  Each round of the 
experiment, the subject was endowed with one A organ (not transplantable) and two B 
organs (transplantable).  In each period, each subject had 10% probability of A organ 
failure and 20% probability of B organs failure (both B organs fail together).  No subject 
was involved into both organ failures at the same time.  Whenever an A organ failure 
happened to a subject, he was considered dead in that round and the round ended for him.  
When a subject’s A organ failed, his B organs were still alive and transplantable in that 
period.  Whenever a subject’s B organs failed, he was placed on a waiting list to receive 
one B organ donated by others (for example, people have two kidneys, but can still live 
with one healthy kidney).  Subjects with B failure had up to 5 periods to stay on the list.  
If they did not receive a B organ within the given periods, they were considered dead in 
that round and the round ended for them.  
Subjects started each round with the default of being a non-donor.  At the 
beginning of each round subjects were asked to make a decision about whether they 
wanted to register as an organ donor, so that subjects made their decisions before 
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knowing whether they would be involved in an organ failure.  All subjects were told that 
if they chose to be a donor and their A organ failed first, each of their B organs would be 
donated to the subjects who were on the waiting list in that period.  However, if their B 
organs failed first, their active A organ could not be donated.  In addition, if they received 
a B organ from others, this received B organ could not be donated again.   
There were two types of costs involved in the donation decision making.
24
  
Subjects were told that they had to pay $0.75 to register as a donor.  This cost can be 
thought as the transaction cost of donor registry.  Subjects were also told that a virtual 
donation would cost them $2.25.  This donation cost can be thought as the psychological 
costs for the donors and their families to actually donate organs.  
 
Figure 5. Screenshot of the Experimental Program 
                                                 
24 
This is a consistent design with Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013).  Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013) designed two types 
of costs to measure the effect of different default choices on donation decision.  Since I am using part of the data from 
Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013) in my analysis, I kept the same design so data from the two works is comparable. 
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After making the donation decision, subjects observed their health status.  
Subjects were told at the beginning of the experiment that they were able to earn $3 in 
each period that they had both one A organ and at least one B organ.  Figure 5 shows a 
screenshot of the information screen that was presented to the subjects.  Subjects received 
information about their health status in each period, their earnings in each period, and 
their accumulated earnings in that round.  Once a subject’s B organs failed, they started 
to observe the waiting list information: how many periods they have been waiting, their 
rank on the waiting list and whether they receives a B organ in that period.  If subjects are 
considered dead, they are not able to observe any more information until the new round 
starts. 
All subjects were informed at the beginning of the experiment that only one round 
would be randomly selected to be paid at the end of the experiment.  Subjects were told at 
the beginning of experiment that they had earned $10 for showing up at the experiment.  
If their earnings were less than the donation cost in the selected payment round, the extra 
cost would be deducted from their show-up earnings. 
The experimental treatments varied the content of the registration request 
provided to subjects.  In the control treatment, subjects faced a request states: 
“In this round, you are not an organ donor by default.  If you 
want to change your status to be a donor, please check the box 
below; otherwise, please leave it empty. 
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□ I hereby agree to donate my organs after I cease to 
participate in this round.” 
Besides the message above, subjects in the information treatment received a 
message about benefits of organ donation in the experiment ― the additional earnings a 
subject earned on average after he was saved by a B organ donated by others.  This 
information was collected from data attained in Li, Hawley, and Schnier (2013).  The 
message was stated as follows: 
“According to the data collected from previous sessions of the 
same experiment series, a subject who was saved by a donated 
organ earned $10.18 more on average in each round, 
compared with the average earnings of $18.63 per subject per 
round.” 
I conducted three experimental sessions of each treatment, with 15 subjects in 
each session.  There were 30 rounds in each session of the experiment.  In each session, 
subjects experienced a break between round 15 and 16.
25
  Subjects were stopped after 
round 15 and told that they would start a new treatment, but there was no change in the 
rules.  The experimenter again handed out the instructions and reviewed all rules.  
                                                 
25
 This is another consistent design with Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013).  Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013) adopted a 
within-subject design where subjects in each session play the first 15 rounds in one treatment and followed by 15 
rounds in another treatment.  I combined data from three sessions in Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013) with my data 
analysis.  In these three sessions, Li, Hawley and Schnier (2013) had subjects play a control treatment through all 30 
rounds, though they still experienced a break between round 15 and 16.   I kept the same design so data from the two 
works are comparable. 
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After finishing all 30 rounds, subjects were informed of which round was 
randomly selected for payment.  At the same time, subjects were asked whether they 
would like to receive a flier containing some information about organ donation.  While 
the experimenters were preparing for payment, subjects were presented with a 
questionnaire on their demographic characteristics.  After they completed the 
questionnaire, subjects received their payments in cash one by one and those who 
requested fliers were also provided with an organ donation flier. 
Results 
The experiment was performed in the laboratory of the Georgia State University 
Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN).
26
  Subjects were recruited from the 
undergraduate student body using a recruiting program that randomly invites registered 
subjects to participate in the experiment.  Data of the control treatment was collected 
from three sessions of the experiment by Li, Hawley, and Schnier (2013), which was 
conducted in April 2012.  A total of 45 subjects participated in these 3 sessions of 
experiment and the average payment was $17.38.  Three session of the information 
treatment were conducted in April 2013, with the total participation of 45 subjects.  The 
average payment for the last three sessions was $15.72.  Table 8 presents the descriptive 
statistics for all six sessions of the experiment.  There are 2700 observations at the 
subject-round level.  The average donor registration rate for all sessions is 30.7%, while 
the average payment is $16.55.  Among all selected subjects, 47.8% of them were self-
                                                 
26 
The experiment was conducted on computers using the experimental software z-Tree 3.3.6 (Fischbacher, 2007). 
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reported as organ donors in real life, and 22.2% requested a flier containing additional 
information about organ donation at the end of the experiment. 
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for the Experiment  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Round Profit 2700 8.546 9.338 -3 78 
Payment 2700 16.550 7.103 7 34 
Donor Registration Rate 2700 0.307 0.461 0 1 
Real Life Donors 2700 0.478 0.500 0 1 
Organ Donation Fliers 2700 0.222 0.416 0 1 
White 2700 0.200 0.400 0 1 
Male 2700 0.422 0.494 0 1 
 
I conducted a series of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to compare donation decisions of 
subjects across treatments.  Table 9 illustrates the summary statistics across treatments 
and the results from the tests.  The results are reported according to four different data 
partitions.  The first pools the data across all rounds.  The second partition focuses on the 
first 10 rounds of the experiment, the third one focuses on round 11-20, while the forth 
one focuses on the last 10 rounds.  The average registration rate across all rounds is 
29.26% for the control treatment and 32.15% for the information treatment.  The 
difference in registration rates across treatment is not statistically significant.  Over the 
first 10 rounds, the average registration rate is 38.89% for the control treatment, which is 
higher than the 30.44% rate in the control treatment.  This result is statistically 
significant.  However, this behavioral difference across treatments decreases as subjects 
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played more rounds.  One explanation could be subjects in the control treatment collected 
information about the game through playing multiple rounds, including the additional 
earnings a subject earned after he was saved by a donated organ.   Whether or not 
providing this information creates no difference across treatments, as subjects have 
learned the information voluntarily. 
Table 9. Percent Choosing to be a Donor within the Experiment 
 
Pooled Data  Rounds 1-10  Rounds 11-20 
 
Rounds 21-30 
 
Obs Percent (SD)  Percent (SD) 
 
Percent (SD) 
 
Percent (SD) 
Control treatment 
Session 1 450 23.11(42.20)  26.67(44.37) 
 
23.33(42.44) 
 
19.33(39.62) 
Session 2 450 35.33(47.85)  34.00(47.53) 
 
38.67(48.86) 
 
33.33(47.30) 
Session 3 450 29.33(45.58)  30.67(46.27) 
 
28.00(45.05) 
 
29.33(45.68) 
Total 1350 29.26(45.51)  30.44(46.07) 
 
30.00(45.88) 
 
27.33(44.62) 
Information treatment 
Session 4 450 27.11(44.50)  31.33(46.54) 
 
28.00(45.05) 
 
22.00(41.56) 
Session 5 450 20.22(40.21)  28.67(45.37) 
 
19.33(39.62) 
 
12.67(33.37) 
Session 6 450 49.11(50.05)  56.67(49.72) 
 
56.00(49.80) 
 
34.67(47.75) 
Total 1350 32.15(46.72)  38.89(48.80) 
 
34.44(47.57) 
 
23.11(42.20) 
Across treatment comparisons 
Rank-sum test (p-value) 
Total -1.627 (0.1038)  -2.600(0.0078) 
 
-1.426(0.1539) 
 
1.458(0.1450) 
Since there are not clear results from the non-parametric tests showing that 
subjects behaved differently across treatments in the experiment, I further conducted a 
series of probit regressions with additional controls to investigate the marginal effect of 
the persuasive message on donation decisions.  The results of regressions with standard 
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errors clustered by individual are illustrated in Table 10.  The reference group of the 
regressions is donation decision in the control treatment and the independent variables 
include a treatment dummy variable Information.  Regression Model 1 controls for round 
information and its interaction term.  Since subjects experienced a break between round 
15 and 16, I also control whether a decision is made in the first 15 rounds or in the last 15 
rounds of the experiment in Model 1.  The dummy variable Second Treatment equals to 1 
if a treatment is played in the last 15 rounds and it is interacted with the treatment 
dummy.  Regression Model 2 additionally controls for whether the subject is a registered 
organ donor in real life using a dummy variable interaction term.  The dummy variable 
Real Life Donor equals to 1 if a subject was self-reported as a currently registered donor.  
At the end of the experiment, we collected subjects’ preference toward information 
regarding organ donation by asking whether they want to receive a flier containing 
information about organ donation.  Regression Model 3 includes a dummy variable Flier, 
which equals to 1 if a subject was willing to receive the organ donation flier.  I further 
control the effect of information in the previous round on the current registration decision 
(Model 4).   Earnings_Last captures earnings from the previous round.  Saved_Last is a 
dummy variable which equals to 1 if the subject received an organ donated by others in 
the previous round.  SavedEarn_Last represents the additional earnings from the previous 
round after receiving an organ.  Lastly, regression Model 5 includes demographic control 
variables Male and White.  
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Table 10. Probit Regression on the Decision to be a Donor or Not within the Experiment 
 
Probit Estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Information 0.137** 0.214*** 0.215*** 0.217** 0.208** 
 
(0.036)    (0.007)   (0.007)     (0.011)    (0.014)    
Round -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.477) (0.493) (0.463) (0.286) (0.282) 
Round×Info -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.040) (0.039) 
Second Treatment 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.009 
 (0.947) (0.971) (0.929) (0.811) (0.798) 
Second×Info 0.049 0.050 0.049 0.051 0.050 
 (0.379) (0.375) (0.392) (0.388) (0.391) 
      
Real Life Donor  0.163** 0.116 0.121 0.107 
 
 (0.030) (0.148) (0.146) (0.200) 
RealDonor*Info  -0.155 -0.127 -0.138 -0.126 
 
 (0.107) (0.206) (0.172) (0.210) 
      
Flier   0.152* 0.151* 0.147* 
 
  (0.054) (0.061) (0.063) 
      
Earnings_Last    0.001 0.001 
 
   (0.299) (0.299) 
Saved_Last    -0.013 -0.012 
 
   (0.705) (0.733) 
SavedEarn_Last    0.006** 0.006** 
 
   (0.015) (0.021) 
      
Male     0.078 
   
 
 
(0.182) 
White 
  
 
 
0.005 
   
 
 
(0.944) 
   
 
  
   
 
  N 2700 2700 2700 2610 2610 
Chi2 13.989 18.843 24.576 45.25 46.093 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.023 0.036 0.043 0.048 
Note: All variables are expressed as marginal values.  Clustered errors by individual (80 clusters). p-values in 
parentheses.  *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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The probit results also illustrate the treatment differences as statistically significant in 
early rounds of the experiment.  Coefficients on Information and Round×Info in Model 1 
indicate that the persuasive message made subjects about 13% more likely to register as a 
donor in round 1 (p = 0.0446).  The negative coefficient on Round×Info suggests that the 
impact of the persuasive message decreases as subjects played more rounds.  Regression 
Model 1 also controls for whether a decision was made in the first fifteen rounds or in 
last 15 rounds of the experiment.  Coefficients on Second Treatment and Second×Info 
suggest there is not restart effect after the break in either the control treatment or the 
information treatment (p = 0.2208).   
Subjects’ registration decisions in the organ-framed experiment are significantly 
associated with their organ donation decisions in real life (Li, Hawley and Schnier, 2013).  
Regression Model 1 shows consistent findings that subjects who were self-reported as 
organ donors in real life are 16% more likely to register as a donor in the experiment, and 
the result is significant at the 5% level.  The negative coefficient on interaction term 
RealDonor×Info suggests the information treatment affects donation decisions mainly 
among subjects who are not organ donors in real life (p = 0.0104), while the treatment 
effect is very small for those who are self-reported organ donors (p = 0.6401).  The 
significant positive coefficient on Information indicates that the subjects who are non-
donors in real life are about 21 percent more likely to register as a donor in round 1 of the 
information treatment than the control treatment.    
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The dummy variable Flier captures subjects’ preference toward information 
regarding organ donation. 
27
  The positive coefficients on Flier indicate that people who 
want to receive additional information about organ donation are about 15% more likely to 
register as organ donors and the results are significant at the 10% level. 
Regression Model 4 additionally controls for the effect of information in the 
previous round on the donor registration decision.  Although the payment procedure 
applied in the experiment assumes subjects would make their decisions independently 
across rounds, Subjects’ donation decision can be affected by the information about how 
others have contributed (Sell and Wilson, 1991).  Subjects might infer others’ donation 
decision through information in the previous round (e.g. a subject may believe many 
people are donating if he received an organ donated by others when he needed one).  The 
coefficient on SavedEarn_Last is positive and significant at 5% level, indicating that 
subjects are more likely to donate if they remained active longer after receiving a donated 
organ in previous round.  This finding supports our early prediction that subjects learned 
information about the additional earnings a subject earned after he was saved by a 
donated organ through playing the game, causing the elimination of treatment effects as 
subjects played more rounds.  
Regression Model 5 controls for demographic information of subjects.  I did not 
find any behavioral difference across either gender or ethnicity.  Among all selected 
subjects, whites or males are just as likely to donate as their counterparts (p = 0.916).   
                                                 
27 
There were more subjects asked for fliers in the control treatment (27%) than in the information treatment (18%). 
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Conclusion 
The shortage in transplantable organs is a large concern for the American society.  
Although the national registration rate has been slowly increasing over the past 30 years, 
the gap between the number of transplantable organs and the number of waiting list 
patients is still widening.  Future changes in public policy may be required to increase 
organ donations within the United States and prevent deaths from organ shortage.   
This paper provides a proposal to increase donor registry by adding a persuasive 
message with the registration request.  I designed an experiment to investigate the effect 
of providing a persuasive message when appealing for organ donation on the registration 
rate.  The results indicate that the persuasive message has a positive impact on donation 
decisions in the early rounds of the experiment.  The persuasive message makes subjects 
about 21 percent more likely to register as a donor in round 1 of the information 
treatment than the control treatment.  I also find that subjects’ donation decisions in the 
experiment are strongly associated with their real-life organ donor status and providing a 
persuasive message affects donation decisions within the experiment mainly among 
subjects who are self-reported as non-donors in real life.  These findings can enter the 
literature on studying the effect of persuasive messages on charity giving.  It suggests that 
providing persuasive messages with charity appeals could improve donation.  This 
finding also provides evidence that education about organ donation information promotes 
the intent to donate and supports the efficiency of educational intervention.  
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It is worth noting that there are many other proposals to increase the number of 
registered donors.  Drawing from the experiences in several European countries, the 
proposal to change the default option of donor registry has arisen.  It proposes to switch 
the current opt-in system ― in which the default choice is non-donor and individuals 
must register to be an organ donor ― to an opt-out system where individuals are 
presumed to have consented to being an organ donor unless the person explicitly states 
that he does not wish to.  The opt-out system is currently adopted by several European 
countries with high donor registration rates, such as Spain, Austria etc.  The effectiveness 
of the opt-out system has been empirically evidenced (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003, 
2004; Abadie and Gay, 2006; Li, Hawley and Schnier, 2013). 
Another highly publicized proposal is to change the organ allocation rule by 
providing priority to those waiting list patients who have previously registered as organ 
donors.  The priority rule is currently adopted by Israel and Singapore (combined with an 
opt-out registration system), and its effectiveness on registration rate has been 
theoretically and experimentally studied by Kessler and Roth (2012, 2013).  Li, Hawley 
and Schnier (2013) complement Kessler and Roth (2012) by further studying the relative 
effectiveness of alternatives across different default options and organ allocation rules.  
Their results are consistent with Kessler and Roth (2012) that the priority rule has a 
positive impact on the donor registration rate.  They additionally find that the priority rule 
outperforms the opt-out program, while the combination of two policies (Singapore’s 
system) generates the largest increase in the number of registered donors relative to an 
opt-in only program (the U.S. system). 
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Although the effectiveness of these other proposals has been evidenced, 
implementing it may involve a long-term legislative transition and discussions about the 
ethics surrounding this issue.  For example, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968 
(UAGA) makes an individual’s wish to register as an organ donor legally binding under 
the current “opt-in” system.  In contrast, a donor registry under an “opt-out” system is a 
passive choice, which does not provide legal clarity of the deceased’s intent.  Changing 
the default of donor registry might calls for potential change in the gift laws to address 
such legal concerns.  On the other hand, the proposal to change the allocation rule 
involves substantial debate about whether non-medical criteria should be brought in for 
organ allocation.  The paper provides evidence for the effectiveness of the message 
proposal, which may complement other proposals during the transition period. 
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Appendix A: Instructions for Chapter I Experiment 
Instructions (Treatment 1) 
No Talking Allowed 
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision making. In this experiment, you 
will interact with another person, whose identity will remain unknown during and after 
the experiment. We kindly ask you not to talk or communicate with any other participant. 
If you have a question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and 
the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private.  
Randomly Matched 
You will be randomly paired with another participant once the experiment has begun. 
You and your counterpart will be randomly assigned to a role of either decision-maker 1 
or decision-maker 2. Suppose you are decision-maker 1, you would receive an 
information screen on your computer that says “You are decision-maker 1.” Your final 
payoff in this experiment will be determined by decisions made by you and your 
counterpart.  
Game Tree 
You and your counterpart are going to play a game like 
the decision tree pictured on the right. In the tree you 
see four circles where “branches” of the tree meet. 
These circles are the nodes of the decision tree. 
Notice that all circles have either a number or a letter 
in them. The number or letter identifies the owner of 
that node. The circle with the number 1 indicates that 
decision-maker 1 owns that node. Decision-maker 1 will have to take one of the paths 
from that node. The two nodes with the number 2 are owned by decision-maker 2. The 
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node with the letter N is owned by nature. More instructions are coming on what 
determines nature’s move. 
Each node is followed by two paths. Decision-maker 1 will make a choice between paths 
“Exit” and “Engage”, and decision-maker 2 will make a choice between paths “Defect” 
and “Cooperate”. Nature moves either “Left” or “Right”. 
Based on decision-makers’ choices and nature’s move, one of the “ends” of the tree will 
be reached. These ends are the U.S. $ payoffs that each decision-maker will receive. The 
top number is the U.S. $ payoff for decision-maker 1, and the bottom number is the U.S. 
$ payoff for decision-maker 2. For example, if decision-maker 1 chooses “Engage”, 
nature moves “Left”, and decision-maker 2 chooses “Defect”, then decision-make 1 will 
receive a payoff of U.S. $0 and decision-make 2 will receive a payoff of U.S. $30. 
It is clear in the game tree that if decision-maker 1 chooses “Exit”, the total $ payoff for 
both decision-makers is $20(= $10 + $10). If decision-maker 1 chooses “Engage”, the 
total $ payoff for both decision-makers is conditional on nature’s move. When nature 
moves “Left”, the total $ payoff is $30(= $0 + $30 or $15 + $15); while when nature 
moves “Right”, the total $ payoff is $50(= $15 + $35 or $25 + $25). 
Simultaneous Decisions 
Decision-makers make choices without observing the choices of their counterparts, so 
decision-maker 2 would have to make choices based on the assumption that the paired 
decision-maker 1 has chosen “Engage”. Suppose you are decision-maker 2, your choice 
will only determine the final payoff if your counterpart actually chooses “Engage”. If 
your counterpart actually chooses “Exit”, both of you will receive a payoff of U.S. $10 
despite your choice. 
Decision-makers also make choices without observing nature’s move, so decision-maker 
2 would have to make choices for both possible moves of nature. Suppose you are 
decision-maker 2, you would see the screen on your computer say “Suppose your 
counterpart has chosen ‘Engage’ and nature moves LEFT. Please choose the path you 
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want” and “Suppose your counterpart has chosen ‘Engage’ and nature moves RIGHT. 
Please choose the path you want”. 
Nature’s Move 
The experimenter is going to flip a coin in front of every participant to determine nature’s 
move, so there is a 50% probability for each of nature’s possible moves. However, what 
“heads” and “tails” represent is private information for only decision-maker 2. In other 
words, decision-maker 1 eventually will not receive information about nature’s move. 
One-shot Game 
You and your counterpart will only play this decision game ONCE. 
Counterpart’s Choice 
After submitting decisions, each decision-maker will receive information about his or her 
own payoff. Decision-maker 2 will also receive information about nature’s move and his 
or her counterpart’s choice.  
Decision-maker 1 will NOT receive information about his or her counterpart’s choice, 
unless it is revealed by decision-maker 1’s own payoff. However, since decision-maker 1 
will not observe nature’s move, he or she will not be able to infer his or her counterpart’s 
choice all the time. For example, suppose you are decision-maker 1. If you receive a 
payoff of $0, you can infer that you counterpart has chosen “Defect”. If you receive a 
payoff of $25, you can infer that you counterpart has chosen “Cooperate”. However, if 
you receive a payoff of $15, you are NOT able to infer your counterpart’s choice. 
Noteworthy Feature of the Game Tree 
To reiterate, if decision-maker 1 receives a payoff of $15 from the game, he or she will 
NOT be able to figure out whether decision-maker 2 chose “Cooperate” or “Defect”. 
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Show-up Fees 
You have already earned U.S. $5 for arriving to the experiment on time. It will be paid to 
you in cash with your payoff from the game at the end of the experiment. 
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, neither the experimenters nor the other 
subjects nor anyone else will ever be able to link your name or other identifying 
information to your decision. This is accomplished by the following procedure. You have 
received a key contained in a sealed envelope when you walked in the room. Your 
identifying mark in this experiment is the number on your key which is known only by 
you and which you will enter by yourself in the computer. After you finish the decision-
making game, you will collect your money payoff contained in a sealed envelope, from a 
mailbox that only you can open with your key. Your privacy is guaranteed because 
neither your name nor your student ID number will be entered in your computer or 
appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment.  
At the end of the experiment, you will walk one by one to the hallway where the 
mailboxes are to collect your money payoff envelope. The key and mailbox are labeled 
with the same number. But you will be the only person having that key and the only one 
who knows your key number. While collecting the envelope from your mailbox, you are 
kindly requested not to open it immediately. You should wait until you leave the building. 
After collecting the envelope, you must return your key by throwing it in a key-return 
box in the hallway. 
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Instructions (Treatment 2) 
No Talking Allowed 
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision making. In this experiment, you 
will interact with another person, whose identity will remain unknown during and after 
the experiment. We kindly ask you not to talk or communicate with any other participant. 
If you have a question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and 
the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private.  
Randomly Matched 
You will be randomly paired with another participant once the experiment has begun. 
You and your counterpart will be randomly assigned to a role of either decision-maker 1 
or decision-maker 2. Suppose you are decision-maker 1, you would receive an 
information screen on your computer that says “You are decision-maker 1.” Your final 
payoff in this experiment will be determined by decisions made by you and your 
counterpart.  
Game Tree 
You and your counterpart are going to play a game 
like the decision tree pictured on the right. In the tree 
you see four circles where “branches” of the tree 
meet. These circles are the nodes of the decision tree.  
Notice that all circles have either a number or a letter 
in them. The number or letter identifies the owner of 
that node. The circle with the number 1 indicates that 
decision-maker 1 owns that node. Decision-maker 1 
will have to take one of the paths from that node. The two nodes with the number 2 are 
owned by decision-maker 2. The node with the letter N is owned by nature. More 
instructions are coming on what determines nature’s move.  
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Each node is followed by two paths. Decision-maker 1 will make a choice between paths 
“Exit” and “Engage”, and decision-maker 2 will make a choice between paths “Defect” 
and “Cooperate”. Nature moves either “Left” or “Right”.  
Based on decision-makers’ choices and nature’s move, one of the “ends” of the tree will 
be reached. These ends are the U.S. $ payoffs that each decision-maker will receive. The 
top number is the U.S. $ payoff for decision-maker 1, and the bottom number is the U.S. 
$ payoff for decision-maker 2. For example, if decision-maker 1 chooses “Engage”, 
nature moves “Left”, and decision-maker 2 chooses “Defect”, then decision-make 1 will 
receive a payoff of U.S. $0 and decision-make 2 will receive a payoff of U.S. $30. 
It is clear in the game tree that if decision-maker 1 chooses “Exit”, the total $ payoff for 
both decision-makers is $20(= $10+$10). If decision-maker 1 chooses “Engage”, the total 
$ payoff for both decision-makers is conditional on nature’s move. When nature moves 
“Left”, the total $ payoff is $30(= $0 + $30 or $15 + $15); while when nature moves 
“Right”, the total $ payoff is $50(= $15 + $35 or $25 + $25). 
Simultaneous Decisions 
Decision-makers make choices without observing the choices of their counterparts, so 
decision-maker 2 would have to make choices based on the assumption that the paired 
decision-maker 1 has chosen “Engage”. Suppose you are decision-maker 2, your choice 
will only determinate the final payoff if your counterpart actually chooses “Engage”. If 
your counterpart actually chooses “Exit”, both of you will receive a payoff of U.S. $10 
despite your choice. 
Decision-makers also make choices without observing nature’s move, so decision-maker 
2 would have to make choices for both possible moves of nature. Suppose you are 
decision-maker 2, you would see the screen on your computer say “Suppose your 
counterpart has chosen ‘Engage’ and nature moves LEFT. Please choose the path you 
want.” and “Suppose your counterpart has chosen ‘Engage’ and nature moves RIGHT. 
Please choose the path you want.” 
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Nature’s Move 
The experimenter is going to flip a coin in front of every participant to determine nature’s 
move, so there is a 50% probability for each of nature’s possible moves. Both decision-
makers will receive information about what “heads” and “tails” represent.  
One-shot Game 
You and your counterpart will only play this decision game ONCE. 
Counterpart’s Choice 
After submitting decisions, each decision-maker will receive information about nature’s 
move and his or her own payoffs. Decision-maker 2 will also receive information about 
his or her counterpart’s choice.  
Decision-maker 1 will NOT receive information about his or her counterpart’s choice. 
However, the counterpart’s choice can be revealed by nature’s move and his or her own 
payoff. For example, suppose you are decision-maker 1. If you know that nature moves 
left and you receive a payoff of $15, you can infer that you counterpart has chosen 
“Cooperate”. On the other hand, if you know that nature moves right and you receive a 
payoff of $15, you can infer that you counterpart has chosen “Defect”. 
Noteworthy Feature of the Game Tree 
To reiterate, if decision-maker 1 receives a payoff of $15 from the game, he or she will 
be able to figure out whether decision-maker 2 chose “Cooperate” or “Defect”. 
Show-up Fees 
You have already earned U.S. $5 for arriving to the experiment on time. It will be paid to 
you in cash with your payoff from the game at the end of the experiment. 
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Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, neither the experimenters nor the other 
subjects nor anyone else will ever be able to link your name or other identifying 
information to your decision. This is accomplished by the following procedure. You have 
received a key contained in a sealed envelope when you walked in the room. Your 
identifying mark in this experiment is the number on your key which is known only by 
you and which you will enter by yourself in the computer. After you finish the decision-
making game, you will collect your money payoff contained in a sealed envelope, from a 
mailbox that only you can open with your key. Your privacy is guaranteed because 
neither your name nor your student ID number will be entered in your computer or 
appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment.  
At the end of the experiment, you will walk one by one to the hallway where the 
mailboxes are to collect your money payoff envelope. The key and mailbox are labeled 
with the same number. But you will be the only person having that key and the only one 
who knows your key number. While collecting the envelope from your mailbox, you are 
kindly requested not to open it immediately. You should wait until you leave the building. 
After collecting the envelope, you must return your key by throwing it in a key-return 
box in the hallway.  
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Appendix B: Parametric Tests of Chapter II Experiment 
Given the complexity of the decision environment we elected to simulate the 
decision environment to inform our parameterization of the experiment.  The most 
critical parameter in our experiment is the probability of organ failure.  There are two 
types of organ failure in our experiment.  Subjects with an A organ failure potentially 
provide transplantable organs for subjects with a B organ failure.  The ratio of the 
probability of B organ failure to the probability of A organ failure should be high enough 
to keep the scarcity of transplantable organs high, but it also cannot be too high because it 
will cancel out the incentive to donate in the Priority treatment.  Figure 6 shows the 
expected payoff difference between donors and non-donors for different parameter values 
in both the Control treatment and the Priority treatment (based on 100,000 simulations of 
donation rate from 0% to 100% for each set of parameters).  The parameter values vary 
the ratio of the probability of B organ failure to the probability of A organ failure (Beta in 
Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Simulations Payoff Difference between Being a Donor and a Non-donor 
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In Figure 6, the teal blue line represents the expected payoff difference with the 
parameters actually used in the experiment (Beta = 2), consistent with those used by 
Kessler and Roth (2012).  In the Control treatment, being a donor is more costly that 
being a non-donor, which would predict no donation in the game.  Non-zero donation in 
the Control treatment would be the expression of altruistic motivation.  In the Priority 
treatment, the payoff difference is increasing with the donation rate.  It is worth noting 
that once Beta exceeds two the payoff difference start to fall off again and the benefits of 
being a donor are reduced.  The reason for these results is an increase in Beta generates 
an overwhelming gap between organ demand and supply.  Due to the high odds of having 
a B organ failure and the insufficient organ supply, the probability of dying while waiting 
for a B organ increases even for donors who have priority on the waiting list.  The 
incentive to donate provided by priority rule is canceled out, since having priority on the 
waiting list does not generate benefit any more. 
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Appendix C: Instructions for Chapter II Experiment 
Instructions (Opt-in Treatment) 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after you finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. In today’s experiment, you are going 
to make decisions about hypothetical organ donation. None of the choices you make in 
the experiment today will affect your real life.   
Show-up Fee 
You have already earned U.S. $10 for arriving to the experiment on time. 
Experiment   
There are multiple rounds in the experiment today. In each round, you are assigned a 
virtual life. A virtual life comprises of one A organ and two B organs. Each round 
consists of a finite number of periods in which you can earn money. 
In each period of any round, you have a 10% probability of A organ failure and a 20% 
probability of B organ failure (both B organs fail together). You will never experience 
both types of organ failure at the same time. Whenever your A organ fails, you will cease 
to participate in that round. Whenever your B organs fail, you will be placed on a waiting 
list to receive one B organ donated from others. You may remain on the waiting list for 
up to 5 periods. If you do not receive a B organ within the 5 periods, you will cease to 
participate in that round. 
Waiting List 
If your B organ fails, you will be placed on a waiting list to receive one B organ donated 
by others in the order of your rank on the list. The rank is determined by the length of 
time that one has been waiting on the list. Those who have been waiting longer are 
78 
 
 
ranked higher. Ranks of those who have the same waiting time are randomly determined. 
For example, if there are two persons on the waiting list. Person 1 has been waiting for 4 
periods and person 2 has been waiting for 3 periods. According to the rule, person 1 ranks 
higher than person 2 on the list. If there were an active B organ donated, it would go to 
person 1 before person 2.   
Earnings of Each Round 
You will earn $3 in each period that you have an active A organ and at least one active B 
organ. However, you will not earn any money in any period that you are on the waiting 
list or you are no longer actively participating in the round. 
Organ Donation Decision and Cost 
At the beginning of each round, you begin by not being an organ donor. You will be 
asked to declare whether you want to change your status and become an organ donor in 
that round. Being an organ donor may potentially save two subjects who are in need of B 
organ and increase their earnings in that round. If you want to change your status, you 
must register yourself by checking the box on your screen; otherwise, you can leave the 
box empty. Please note that the organ donor registration (checking the box) will cost you 
$0.75. This registration cost will be charged whether or not you actually become a donor.  
If you choose to be a donor and your A organ fails, your active B organs will be donated 
to those in need of a B organ in the order of their rank on the waiting list. Please note that 
the realized donation will cost you $2.25. This donation cost will only be charged if 
donation actually takes place.  The organs you donated cannot be re-donated by 
recipients. 
Final Payoff 
Your payoff in each round is equal to your earnings in that round minus your costs of 
donation. There are multiple rounds in the experiment; however, only ONE round will be 
randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Thus, you should make your 
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decision in each round independently of your choice in other rounds.  If in this selected 
round your earnings cannot cover your cost of donation, the extra cost will be charged 
from your show-up fee. 
Instructions (Opt-out Treatment) 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after you finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. In today’s experiment, you are going 
to make decisions about hypothetical organ donation. None of the choices you make in 
the experiment today will affect your real life.   
Show-up Fee 
You have already earned U.S. $10 for arriving to the experiment on time. 
Experiment   
There are multiple rounds in the experiment today. In each round, you are assigned a 
virtual life. A virtual life comprises of one A organ and two B organs. Each round 
consists of a finite number of periods in which you can earn money. 
In each period of any round, you have a 10% probability of A organ failure and a 20% 
probability of B organ failure (both B organs fail together). You will never experience 
both types of organ failure at the same time. Whenever your A organ fails, you will cease 
to participate in that round. Whenever your B organs fail, you will be placed on a waiting 
list to receive one B organ donated from others. You may remain on the waiting list for 
up to 5 periods. If you do not receive a B organ within the 5 periods, you will cease to 
participate in that round. 
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Waiting List 
If your B organ fails, you will be placed on a waiting list to receive one B organ donated 
by others in the order of your rank on the list. The rank is determined by two criteria: first 
one’s donation decision, and second the length of time that one has been waiting on the 
list. If you are an organ donor, you will be given priority in ranking on the waiting list. 
Donors are ranked higher than the non-donors. Individuals with the same donation 
decision will be ranked according to the length of time they have been waiting. Those 
waiting longer are ranked higher. The ranks of those who have the same waiting time are 
randomly determined. For example, if there are two persons on the waiting list. Person 1 
is an unregistered donor who has been waiting for 4 periods and person 2 is a registered 
donor who has been waiting for 3 periods. Person 2 will rank higher than person 1. If 
there were an active B organ donated, it would go to person 2 before person 1.   
To reiterate, if you are not a donor, you will be ranked behind donors on the waiting list. 
Earnings of Each Round 
You will earn $3 in each period that you have an active A organ and at least one active B 
organ. However, you will not earn any money in any period that you are on the waiting 
list or you are no longer actively participating in the round. 
Organ Donation Decision and Cost 
At the beginning of each round, you begin by not being an organ donor. You will be 
asked to declare whether you want to change your status and become an organ donor in 
that round. Being an organ donor may potentially save two subjects who are in need of B 
organ and increase their earnings in that round. If you want to change your status, you 
must register yourself by checking the box on your screen; otherwise, you can leave the 
box empty. Please note that the organ donor registration (checking the box) will cost you 
$0.75. This registration cost will be charged whether or not you actually become a donor.  
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If you choose to be a donor and your A organ fails, your active B organs will be donated 
to those in need of a B organ in the order of their rank on the waiting list. Please note that 
the realized donation will cost you $2.25. This donation cost will only be charged if 
donation actually takes place.  The organs you donated cannot be re-donated by 
recipients. 
Final Payoff 
Your payoff in each round is equal to your earnings in that round minus your costs of 
donation. There are multiple rounds in the experiment; however, only ONE round will be 
randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Thus, you should make your 
decision in each round independently of your choice in other rounds.  If in this selected 
round your earnings cannot cover your cost of donation, the extra cost will be charged 
from your show-up fee. 
Instructions (Priority Treatment) 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after you finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. In today’s experiment, you are going 
to make decisions about hypothetical organ donation. None of the choices you make in 
the experiment today will affect your real life.   
Show-up Fee 
You have already earned U.S. $10 for arriving to the experiment on time. 
Experiment   
There are multiple rounds in the experiment today. In each round, you are assigned a 
virtual life. A virtual life comprises of one A organ and two B organs. Each round 
consists of a finite number of periods in which you can earn money. 
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In each period of any round, you have a 10% probability of A organ failure and a 20% 
probability of B organ failure (both B organs fail together). You will never experience 
both types of organ failure at the same time. Whenever your A organ fails, you will cease 
to participate in that round. Whenever your B organs fail, you will be placed on a waiting 
list to receive one B organ donated from others. You may remain on the waiting list for 
up to 5 periods. If you do not receive a B organ within the 5 periods, you will cease to 
participate in that round. 
Waiting List 
If your B organ fails, you will be placed on a waiting list to receive one B organ donated 
by others in the order of your rank on the list. The rank is determined by two criteria: first 
one’s donation decision, and second the length of time that one has been waiting on the 
list. If you are an organ donor, you will be given priority in ranking on the waiting list. 
Donors are ranked higher than the non-donors. Individuals with the same donation 
decision will be ranked according to the length of time they have been waiting.  Those 
waiting longer are ranked higher. The ranks of those who have the same waiting time are 
randomly determined. For example, if there are two persons on the waiting list. Person 1 
is an unregistered donor who has been waiting for 4 periods and person 2 is a registered 
donor who has been waiting for 3 periods. Person 2 will rank higher than person 1. If 
there were an active B organ donated, it would go to person 2 before person 1.   
To reiterate, if you are not a donor, you will be ranked behind donors on the waiting list. 
Earnings of Each Round 
You will earn $3 in each period that you have an active A organ and at least one active B 
organ. However, you will not earn any money in any period that you are on the waiting 
list or you are no longer actively participating in the round. 
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Organ Donation Decision and Cost 
At the beginning of each round, you begin by being an organ donor. You will be asked to 
declare whether you want to change your status and become a non-donor in that round. 
Being an organ donor may potentially save two subjects who are in need of B organ and 
increase their earnings in that round. However, if you want to change your status, you 
must withdraw yourself by checking the box on your screen; otherwise, you can leave the 
box empty. Please note that the decision to withdrawal from being an organ donor 
(checking the box) will cost you $0.75.  
If you keep your status as an organ donor and your A organ fails, your active B organs 
will be donated to those in need of a B organ in the order of their rank on the waiting list. 
Please note that the realized donation will cost you $2.25. This donation cost will only be 
charged if donation actually takes place.  The organs you donated cannot be re-donated 
by recipients. 
Final Payoff 
Your payoff in each round is equal to your earnings in that round minus your costs of 
donation. There are multiple rounds in the experiment; however, only ONE round will be 
randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Thus, you should make your 
decision in each round independently of your choice in other rounds.  If in this selected 
round your earnings cannot cover your cost of donation, the extra cost will be charged 
from your show-up fee. 
Instructions (Opt-out with Priority Treatment) 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private.  
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Show-up Fee 
You have already earned U.S. $10 for arriving to the experiment on time. 
Experiment   
There are multiple rounds in the experiment today. At the beginning of each round, you 
will be assigned with three tokens: one A token and two B tokens. Each round of the 
experiment consists of a finite number of periods in which you can potentially earn more 
money. 
In each period of any round, it is possible that you will lose your tokens. There is a 10% 
probability of losing an A token and 20% probability of losing both B tokens (both B 
tokens will be lost the same time). You will not lose both types of tokens at the same 
time. Whenever you lose an A token in a round, you will cease to participate in that 
round. Whenever you lose both B tokens in a round, you will be placed on a waiting list 
to receive a B token donated by others. You may remain on the waiting list for up to 5 
periods. If you do not receive one B token within the 5 periods, you will cease to 
participate in that round. 
Waiting List 
If you lose your B tokens, you will be placed on a waiting list to receive one donated by 
others in the order of your rank on the list. The rank is determined by the length of time 
that one has been waiting on the list, and the ones who have been waiting longer are 
ranked higher. The ranks of those who have the same waiting time are randomly 
determined. For example, if there are two persons on the waiting list. Person 1 has been 
waiting for 4 periods and person 2 has been waiting for 3 periods. According to the rule, 
person 1 ranks higher than person 2 on the list. Whenever there is an available B token, it 
will go to person 1 before person 2.   
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Earnings of Each Round 
You will earn $3 in each period in which you have one A token and at least one B token. 
Please note that you will not earn any money in a period in which you are on the waiting 
list or you are no longer actively participating in the round (i.e., do not have at least one 
active B token).  
Donation Decision and Cost 
At the beginning of each round, you will be asked to declare whether you want to donate 
your B tokens after you lost your A token. Donating may potentially increase other’s 
earnings in that round. If you want to donate your B tokens, you must register yourself as 
a donor by checking the box on your screen; otherwise, you can leave the box empty. 
Please note that the decision to register as a donor (checking the box) will cost you $0.75. 
If you choose to be a donor and you lose your A token, your B tokens will be donated to 
those who are on the waiting list in the order of their rank. Please note that the realized 
donation will cost you $2.25. This donation cost will only be charged if a donation 
actually takes place.  The tokens you donated cannot be re-donated by recipients. 
Final Payoff 
Your payoff in a round is equal to your earnings in that round minus your costs of 
donation. There are multiple rounds in the experiment; however, only ONE round will be 
randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Thus, you should make your 
decision in each round independently of your choice in other rounds.  If in this selected 
round your earnings cannot cover your cost of donation, the extra cost will be charged 
from your show-up fee. 
 
 
86 
 
 
Appendix D: Instructions for Chapter III Experiment 
Instructions (Information Treatment) 
Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question 
after you finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will 
approach you and answer your question in private. In today’s experiment, you are going 
to make decisions about hypothetical organ donation. None of the choices you make in 
the experiment today will affect your real life.   
Show-up Fee 
You have already earned U.S. $10 for arriving to the experiment on time. 
Experiment   
There are multiple rounds in the experiment today. In each round, you are assigned a 
virtual life. A virtual life comprises of one A organ and two B organs. Each round 
consists of a finite number of periods in which you can earn money. 
In each period of any round, you have a 10% probability of A organ failure and a 20% 
probability of B organ failure (both B organs fail together). You will never experience 
both types of organ failure at the same time. Whenever your A organ fails, you will cease 
to participate in that round. Whenever your B organs fail, you will be placed on a waiting 
list to receive one B organ donated from others. You may remain on the waiting list for 
up to 5 periods. If you do not receive a B organ within the 5 periods, you will cease to 
participate in that round. 
Waiting List 
If your B organ fails, you will be placed on a waiting list to receive one B organ donated 
by others in the order of your rank on the list. The rank is determined by the length of 
time that one has been waiting on the list. Those who have been waiting longer are 
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ranked higher. Ranks of those who have the same waiting time are randomly determined. 
For example, if there are two persons on the waiting list. Person 1 has been waiting for 4 
periods and person 2 has been waiting for 3 periods. According to the rule, person 1 ranks 
higher than person 2 on the list. If there were an active B organ donated, it would go to 
person 1 before person 2.   
Earnings of Each Round 
You will earn $3 in each period that you have an active A organ and at least one active B 
organ. However, you will not earn any money in any period that you are on the waiting 
list or you are no longer actively participating in the round. 
Organ Donation Decision and Cost 
At the beginning of each round, you begin by not being an organ donor. You will be 
asked to declare whether you want to change your status and become an organ donor in 
that round. Being an organ donor may potentially save two subjects who are in need of B 
organ and increase their earnings in that round.  
 
 
 
If you want to change your status, you must register yourself by checking the box on your 
screen; otherwise, you can leave the box empty. Please note that the organ donor 
registration (checking the box) will cost you $0.75. This registration cost will be charged 
whether or not you actually become a donor.  
If you choose to be a donor and your A organ fails, your active B organs will be donated 
to those in need of a B organ in the order of their rank on the waiting list. Please note that 
the realized donation will cost you $2.25. This donation cost will only be charged if 
According to the data collected from previous sessions of the same 
experiment series, a subject who was saved by a donated organ 
earned $10.18 more on average in each round, compared with the 
average earnings of $18.63 per subject per round. 
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donation actually takes place.  The organs you donated cannot be re-donated by 
recipients. 
Final Payoff 
Your payoff in each round is equal to your earnings in that round minus your costs of 
donation. There are multiple rounds in the experiment; however, only ONE round will be 
randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Thus, you should make your 
decision in each round independently of your choice in other rounds.  If in this selected 
round your earnings cannot cover your cost of donation, the extra cost will be charged 
from your show-up fee. 
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